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Abstract
This paper describes a novel method for building affectively intelligent human-interactive
agents. The method is based on a key sociological insight that has been developed and ex-
tensively verified over the last twenty years, but has yet to make an impact in artificial
intelligence. The insight is that resource bounded humans will, by default, act to maintain
affective consistency. Humans have culturally shared fundamental affective sentiments about
identities, behaviours, and objects, and they act so that the transient affective sentiments
created during interactions confirm the fundamental sentiments. Humans seek and create
situations that confirm or are consistent with, and avoid and supress situations that dis-
confirm or are inconsistent with, their culturally shared affective sentiments. This “affect
control principle” has been shown to be a powerful predictor of human behaviour. In this
paper, we present a probabilistic and decision-theoretic generalisation of this principle, and
we demonstrate how it can be leveraged to build affectively intelligent artificial agents. The
new model, called BayesAct, can maintain multiple hypotheses about sentiments simulta-
neously as a probability distribution, and can make use of an explicit utility function to
make value-directed action choices. This allows the model to generate affectively intelligent
interactions with people by learning about their identity, predicting their behaviours using
the affect control principle, and taking actions that are simultaneously goal-directed and
affect-sensitive. We demonstrate this generalisation with a set of simulations. We then show
how our model can be used as an emotional “plug-in” for artificially intelligent systems that
interact with humans in two different settings: an exam practice assistant (tutor) and an
assistive device for persons with a cognitive disability.
1 Introduction
Designers of intelligent systems have increasingly attended to theories of human emotion, in order
to build software interfaces that allow users to experience naturalistic flows of communication
with the computer. This endeavour requires a comprehensive mathematical representation of
the relations between affective states and actions that captures, ideally, the subtle cultural
rules underlying human communication and emotional experience. In this paper, we show that
Affect Control Theory (ACT), a mathematically formalized theory of the interplays between
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cultural representations, interactants’ identities1, and affective experience [21], is a suitable
framework for developing emotionally intelligent agents. To accomplish this, we propose a
probabilistic and decision theoretic generalisation of ACT, called BayesAct, which we argue is
more flexible than the original statement of the theory for the purpose of modelling human-
computer interaction. BayesAct is formulated as a partially observable Markov decision process
or POMDP. The key contributions of this new theory are: (1) to represent affective sentiments
as probability distributions over a continuous affective space, thereby allowing these sentiments
to be dynamic and uncertain; (2) to endow agents with the ability to learn affective identities of
their interactants; (3) to integrate the affective dynamics proposed by affect control theory with
standard POMDP-based propositional artificial intelligence; and (4) to introduce explicit utility
functions that parsimoniously trade-off affective and propositional goals for a human-interactive
agent. These contributions allow BayesAct to be used as an artificially intelligent agent: they
provide the computerised agent with a mechanism for predicting how the affective state of an
interaction will progress (based on affect control theory) and how this will modify the object of
the interaction (e.g. the software application being used). The agent can then select its strategy
of action in order to maximize the expected values of the outcomes based both on the application
state and on its affective alignment with the human.
Affect control theory arises from the long tradition of symbolic interactionism that began almost
three hundred years ago with the insights of Adam Smith (1759) into the self as a mirror of the
society in which it is embedded: the so-called looking-glass self [70]. These insights eventually
led to the modern development of structural symbolic interactionism through Mead, Cooley,
and Stryker [36], and culminating in Heise’s affect control theory (ACT) [21], which this paper
extends. Although ACT, and symbolic interactionism in general, are very well established
theories in sociology, they have had little or no impact in artificial intelligence. This paper is
the first to propose affect control theory as a fundamental substrate for intelligent agents, by
elaborating a POMDP-based formulation of the underlying symbolic interactionist ideas. This
new theory allows ACT to be used in goal-directed human-interactive systems, and thereby
allows A.I. researchers to connect to over fifty years of sociological research on cultural sentiment
sharing and emotional intelligence. The theory also contributes a generalisation of affect control
theory that we expect will lead to novel developments in sociology, social psychology, and in the
emerging field of computational social science [9].
The next section explains ACT and POMDPs in more detail and briefly discusses related work.
Section 3 then gives full details of the new BayesAct model. Section 4 discusses simulation and
human experiments, and Section 5 concludes. Appendices A-E give some additional results and
mathematical details that complement the main development. Parts of this paper appeared in
a shortened form in [25]. More details, simulations and videos can be found at bayesact.ca.
1The meaning of the term identity differs considerably across scientific disciplines. Here, we adhere to the
tradition in sociology where it essentially denotes a kind of person in a social situation.
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2 Background
2.1 Affect Control Theory
Affect control theory (ACT) is a comprehensive social psychological theory of human social
interaction [21]. ACT proposes that peoples’ social perceptions, actions, and emotional expe-
riences are governed by a psychological need to minimize deflections between culturally shared
fundamental sentiments about social situations and transient impressions resulting from the
dynamic behaviours of interactants in those situations.
Fundamental sentiments f are representations of social objects, such as interactants’ identities
and behaviours or environmental settings, as vectors in a three-dimensional affective space. The
basis vectors of the affective space are called Evaluation/valence, Potency/control, and Activ-
ity/arousal (EPA). The EPA space is hypothesised to be a universal organising principle of
human socio-emotional experience, based on the discovery that these dimensions structure the
semantic relations of linguistic concepts across languages and cultures [22, 40–42]. They also
emerged from statistical analyses of the co-occurence of a large variety of physiological, facial,
gestural, and cognitive features of emotional experience [18], relate to the universal dimensional-
ity of personality, non-verbal behaviour, and social cognition [63], and are believed to correspond
to the fundamental logic of social exchange and group coordination [63].
EPA profiles of concepts can be measured with the semantic differential, a survey technique
where respondents rate affective meanings of concepts on numerical scales with opposing adjec-
tives at each end (e.g., {good, nice}↔{bad, awful} for E; {weak, little}↔{strong, big} for P;
{calm, passive}↔{exciting, active} for A). Affect control theorists have compiled databases of
a few thousand words along with average EPA ratings obtained from survey participants who
are knowledgeable about their culture [22]. For example, most English speakers agree that pro-
fessors are about as nice as students (E), however more powerful (P) and less active (A). The
corresponding EPA profiles are [1.7, 1.8, 0.5] for professor and [1.8, 0.7, 1.2] for student (values
range by convention from −4.3 to +4.3 [22]). Shank [68] and Troyer [79] describe experiments to
measure EPA fundamental sentiments related to technology and computer terms. Shank shows
that people have shared cultural identity labels for technological actors, and that they share
affective sentiments about these labels. He also showed that people view these technological
actors as behaving socially, as was previously explored in [52].
In general, within-cultural agreement about EPA meanings of social concepts is high even across
subgroups of society, and cultural-average EPA ratings from as little as a few dozen survey
participants have been shown to be extremely stable over extended periods of time [22]. These
findings may seem surprising in light of ever-present societal conflicts as evidenced for example by
competing political ideologies, but research has consistently shown that the number of contested
concepts is small relative to the stable and consensual semantic structures that form the basis
of our everyday social interactions and shared cultural understanding [22,55].
Social events can cause transient impressions τ of identities and behaviours that deviate from
their corresponding fundamental sentiments f . ACT models this formation of impressions from
events with a minimalist grammar of the form actor-behaviour-object. Extended versions of
ACT’s mathematical models also allow for representing environmental settings (such as a uni-
versity or a funeral) and identity modifiers (such as a boring professor or a lazy student) [2,71,72].
In the interest of parsimony, we will limit our present discussion to the basic actor-behaviour-
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object scheme. Consider, for example, a professor (actor) who yells (behaviour) at a student
(object). Most observers would agree that this professor appears considerably less nice (E), a bit
less potent (P), and certainly more aroused (A) than the cultural average of a professor. Such
transient shifts in affective meaning caused by specific events can be described with models of
the form τ = X (f), where X is a function with statistically estimated parameters from em-
pirical impression-formation studies where survey respondents rated EPA affective meanings of
concepts embedded in a few hundred sample event descriptions such as the example above [21].
Linguistic impression-formation equations exist for English, Japanese, and German [22]. In
ACT, the sum of squared Euclidean distances between fundamental sentiments and transient
impressions is called deflection:
D =
∑
i
wi(fi − τi)2, (1)
where wi are weights (usually set to 1.0).
Affective Deflection is hypothesised to correspond to an aversive state of mind that humans seek
to avoid, leading to the affect control principle [53]:
Definition 1. (Affect Control Principle) actors work to experience transient impressions that
are consistent with their fundamental sentiments.
ACT is thus a variant of psychological consistency theories, which posit in general that humans
strive for balanced mental representations whose elements form a coherent Gestalt [20,75]. In cy-
bernetic terminology, deflection is a control signal used for aligning everyday social interactions
with implicit cultural rules and expectations [21]. For example, advising a student corresponds
much better to the cultural expectation of a professor’s behaviour than yelling at a student. Cor-
respondingly, the deflection for the former event as computed with the ACT equations is much
lower than the deflection for the latter event. Many experimental and observational studies have
shown that deflection is indeed inversely related to the likelihood of humans to engage in the
corresponding social actions. For example, the deflection-minimization mechanism explains ver-
bal behaviours of mock leaders in a computer-simulated business game [66], non-verbal displays
in dyadic interactions [65], and conversational turn-taking in small-group interactions [23].
Interact is an implementation of ACT in Java that gives a user the ability to manually simulate
interactions between two persons with fixed and known identities. The software also comes
with multible databases of EPA ratings for thousands of behaviours and identities, and sets of
predictive equations. Interact is available along with the databases at http://www.indiana.
edu/~socpsy/ACT.
2.2 Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes
A partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) [1] is a general purpose model of
stochastic control that has been extensively studied in operations research [32, 50], and in arti-
ficial intelligence [5,28]. A POMDP consists of a finite set X of states; a finite set A of actions;
a stochastic transition model Pr : X ×A → ∆(X), with Pr(x′|x, a) denoting the probability of
moving from state x to x′ when action a is taken, and ∆(X) is a distribution over X ; a finite
observation set Ωx ; a stochastic observation model with Pr(ωx|x) denoting the probability of
making observation ωx while the system is in state x; and a reward assigning R(x, a, x
′) to state
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transition x to x′ induced by action a. The state is unobservable, but a belief state (a distribu-
tion over X ) can be computed that gives the probability of each state being the current one. A
generic POMDP is shown as a Bayesian decision network in Figure 1(a) (solid lines only).
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Figure 1: Two time slices of (a) a general POMDP (solid lines) and a POMDP augmented with
affective states (dotted lines); (b) a factored POMDP for Bayesian affect control theory;
The POMDP can be used to monitor the belief state using standard Bayesian filtering [44]. A
policy can be computed that maps belief states into choices of actions, such that the expected
discounted (by a factor γd < 1.0) sum of rewards is (approximately) maximised. Recent work on
so-called “point-based” methods had led to the development of solvers that can handle POMDPs
with large state and observation spaces [30,48,67,69].
In this paper, we will be dealing with factored POMDPs in which the state is represented by
the cross-product of a set of variables or features. Assignment of a value to each variable thus
constitutes a state. Factored models allow for conditional independence to be explicitly stated
in the model. A good introduction to POMDPs and solution methods can be found in [49].
2.3 Related Work
Emotions play a significant role in humans’ everyday activities including decision-making, be-
haviours, attention, and perception [12, 13, 45, 76]. This important role is fuelling the interest
in computationally modelling humans’ emotions in fields like affective computing [46,60], social
computing [81], social signal processing [80], and computational social science [9]. Affective
computing research is generally concerned with four main problems: affect recognition (vision-
based, acoustic-based, etc.) [7, 84], generation of affectively modulated signals such as speech
and facial expressions [27, 64], the study of human emotions including affective interactions
and adaptation [74], and modelling affective human-computer interaction, including embodied
conversational agents [4, 8, 26,51].
This paper does not attempt to address the first two questions concerning generation and recog-
nition of affective signals. We assume that we can detect and generate emotional signals in
the affective EPA space. There has been a large body of work in this area and many of the
proposed methods can be integerated as input/output devices with our model. Our model gives
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the mechanism for mapping inputs to outputs based on predictions from ACT combined with
probabilistic and decision theoretic reasoning. The probabilistic nature of our model makes it
ideally suited to the integration of noisy sensor signals of affect, as it has been used for many
other domains with equally noisy signals [78].
Our focus is primarily on the third and fourth questions of how to build intelligent interactive
systems that are emotionally aware using established theories of emotional reasoning. To do
this, we propose to leverage research in sociology on Affect Control Theory (ACT) [21]. ACT is
not currently well-known in the field of affective computing, perhaps because of its intellectual
origins in sociology. Affective computing researchers have attended more to the dominant the-
ories in psychology, and despite an obvious overlap in basic intellectual interests, there is often
little cross-disciplinary knowledge integration between sociologists and psychologists. However,
we think that ACT aligns well with two main families of emotion theories well-known in affective
computing: dimensional theories and appraisal theories. Dimensional theories define emotion
as a core element of a person’s state, usually as a point in a continuous dimensional space of
evaluation or valence, arousal or activity, and sometimes dominance or potency [3, 41, 57], cor-
responding to the EPA dimensions of affect control theory. Appraisal theories come in different
variants, but generally posit that emotional states are generated from cognitive appraisals of
events in the environment in relation to the goals and desires of the agent [39,59,60,62].
As discussed in [54], affect control theory is conceptually compatible with both dimensional and
appraisal theories. The connections with dimensional theories are obvious since emotions in
ACT are represented as vectors in a continuous dimensional space. However, our generalisation,
BayesAct, releases ACT from the constraint of representing emotion as a single point in affective
space, since it represents emotions as probability distributions over this space. This allows
BayesAct to represent mixed states of emotions, something usually lacking from dimensional
theories, but often found in appraisal theories [35].
The connection of ACT with appraisal theories comes from the assumption that emotions result
from subjective interpretations of events rather than immediate physical properties of external
stimuli [54]. Appraisal theorists describe a set of fixed rules or criteria for mapping specific
patterns of cognitive evaluations onto specific emotional states. The logic of ACT is quite
similar: emotional states result from interpretations of observed events. The difference is that
ACT emphasizes the cultural embeddedness of these interpretations through the central role of
language in the sense-making process. This reasoning stems from the origins of the theory in
symbolic interactionism [33], a dominant paradigm in sociology. The reliance upon linguistic
categories ensures that individual appraisals of situations follow culturally shared patterns. The
reason why this approach is easily reconciled with appraisal theories is the fact that the EPA
dimensions of affective space organize linguistic categories, as discussed above. These dimensions
can be understood as very basic appraisal rules related to the goal congruence of an event
(E), the agent’s coping potential (P), and the urgency implied by the situation (A) [54, 61].
However, ACT is also more general and more parsimonious than many appraisal theories, since
it works without explicitly defining complex sets of rules relating specific goals and states of
the environment to specific emotions. Instead, ACT treats the dynamics of emotional states
and behaviours as continuous trajectories in affective space. Deflection minimisation is the only
prescribed mechanism, while the more specific goals tied to types of agents and situations are
assumed to emerge from the semantic knowledge base of the model.
Recently, significant work has emerged in affective computing that uses probabilistic reasoning
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to build intelligent interactive systems. Pynadath and Marsella [51] use a POMDP model of
psychological consistency theories to build interactive agents. Their model estimates the relative
value of actions based on various application-specific appraisal dimensions and a variety of influ-
ence factors such as consistency, self interest and “bias”. However, the dimensions and influences
are defined in an application-specific manner, and it is not clear if they would generalise to other
applications. In a similar vein, an adaptive system combining fuzzy logic with reinforcement
learning is described in [16]. This model also uses application-dependent appraisal rules based
on the OCC model [39] to generate emotional states, and a set of ad-hoc rules to generate ac-
tions. Bayesian networks and probabilistic models have also seen recent developments [10, 58]
based on appraisal theory [39]. In contrast to these rule-based systems, BayesAct proposes a
more general set of appraisal dimensions, and a general affective action “overlay” that modu-
lates any actions that are taken. The affective dimensions and actions are both learned from
extensive experimental evidence. BayesAct has demonstrated that, by operating completely in
a dimensional space, we can surmount computational issues, assure scalability (the state space
size only grows with the amount of state necessary to represent the application, not with the
number of emotion labels), and we can explicitly encode prior knowledge obtained empirically
through a well-defined methodology [21].
Conati and Maclaren [10] use a decision theoretic model to build an affectively intelligent tutoring
system, but again rely on sets of labelled emotions and rules from appraisal theories. This is
typically done in order to ease interpretability and computability, and to allow for the encoding
of detailed prior knowledge into an affective computing application. BayesAct does not require
a statically defined client (e.g. student) or agent (e.g. tutor) identity, but allows the student
and tutor to dynamically change their perceived identities during the interaction. This allows
for much greater flexibility on the part of the agent to adapt to specific user types “on the fly”
by dynamically learning their identity, and adapting strategies based on the decision theoretic
and probabilistic model. Tractable representations of intelligent tutoring systems as POMDPs
have recently been explored [17], and allow the modelling of up to 100 features of the student
and learning process. Other recent work on POMDP models for tutoring systems include [6,77].
Our emotional “plug-in” would seamlessly integrate into such POMDP models, as they also
use Monte-Carlo based solution methods [30]. The example we explore in Section 4.2.1 is a
simplified version of these existing tutoring system models.
POMDPs have been widely used in mobile robotics [47], for intelligent tutoring systems [10,
17, 77], in spoken-dialog systems [82], and in assistive technology [24, 37]. In section 4.2.2 we
present apply our affective reasoning engine to a POMDP-based system that helps a person with
Alzheimer’s disease to handwash [37].
3 Bayesian Formulation of ACT
We are modelling an interaction between an agent (the computer system) and a client (the
human), and will be formulating the model from the perspective of the agent (although this is
symmetric). We will use notational conventions where capital symbols (F,T) denote variables or
features, small symbols (f, τ) denote values of these variables, and boldface symbols (F,T, f , τ )
denote sets of variables or values. We use primes to denote post-action variables, so x′ means
the value of the variable X after a single time step.
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A human-interactive system can be represented at a very abstract level using a POMDP as
shown in Figure 1(a, solid lines). In this case, X represents everything the system needs to
know about both the human’s behaviours and the system state, and can itself be factored into
multiple correlated attributes. For example, in a tutoring system, X might represent the current
state of the student’s knowledge, the level at which they are working, or a summary of their
recent test success. The observations Ωx are anything the system observes in the environment
that gives it evidence about the state X. In a tutoring system, this might be what the student
has clicked on, or if the student is looking at the screen or not. The system actions A are
things the system can do to change the state (e.g. give a test, present an exercise, modify
the interface, move a robot) or to modify the human’s behaviours (e.g. give a prompt, give
an order). Finally, the reward function is defined over state-action pairs and rewards those
states and actions that are beneficial overall to the goals of the system-human interaction. In a
tutoring system, this could be getting the student to pass a test, for example. Missing from this
basic model are the affective elements of the interaction, which can have a significant influence
on a person’s behaviour. For example, a tutor who imperatively challenges a student “Do this
exercise now!” will be viewed differently than one who meekly suggests “here’s an exercise you
might try...”. While the propositional content of the action is the same (the same exercise is
given), the affective delivery will influence different students in different ways. While some may
respond vigorously to the challenge, others may respond more effectively to the suggestion.
3.1 Basic Formulation
Bayesian affect control theory (BayesAct for short) gives us a principled way to add the emotional
content to a human interactive system by making four key additions to the basic POMDP model,
as shown by the dashed lines in Figure 1(a):
1. An unobservable variable, Y, describes sentiments of the agent about identities and be-
haviours. The dynamics of Y is given by empirical measurements in ACT (see below).
2. Observations Ωf give evidence about the part of the sentiments Y encoding behaviours
of the client.
3. The actions of the agent are now expanded to be B = {A,Ba}. The normal state transition
dynamics can still occur based only on A, but now the action space also must include an
affective “how” for the delivery “what” of an action.
4. The application-specific dynamics of X now depends on sentiments, Pr(X′|X,Y′, A), and
will generally follow the original distribution Pr(X′|X, A), but now moderated by de-
flection. For example, X may move towards a goal, but less quickly when deflection is
high.
Figure 1(b) shows a graphical model of the ACT model we are proposing. We can make the
association of the state S = {F,T,X}, the observations O = {Ωx,Ωf}, and the action B =
{A,Ba}. We denote Y={F,T}, S={Y,X} and Ω={Ωf ,Ωx}.
Let F = {Fij} denote the set of fundamental agent sentiments about itself where each feature
Fij , i ∈ {a, b, c}, j ∈ {e, p, a} denotes the jth fundamental sentiment (evaluation, potency or
activity) about the ith interaction object: actor (agent), behaviour, or object (client). Let
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T = {Tij} be similarly defined and denote the set of transient agent sentiments. Variables Fij
and Tij are continuous valued and F,T are each vectors in a continuous nine-dimensional space.
Indices will always be in the same order: sentiment on the right and object on the left, thereby
resolving the ambiguity between the two uses of the index “a”. We will use a “dot” to represent
that all values are present if there is any ambiguity. For example, the behaviour component
of F is written Fb· or Fb for short. In a tutoring system, F would represent the fundamental
sentiments the agent has about itself (Fa·), about the student (Fc·) and about the most recent
(tutor or student) behaviour (Fb·). T would respresent the transient impressions created by
the sequence of recent events (presentations of exercise, tests, encouraging comments, etc). T
may differ significantly from F, for example if the student “swears at” the tutor, he will seem
considerably more “bad” than as given by shared fundamental sentiments about students (so
Tce < Fce).
Affect control theory encodes the identities as being for “actor” (A, the person acting) and
“object” (O, the person being acted upon). In BayesAct, we encode identities as being for
“agent” and “client” (regardless of who is currently acting). However, this means that we need
to know who is currently acting, and the prediction equations will need to be inverted to handle
turn-taking during an interaction. This poses no significant issues, but must be kept in mind if
one is trying to understand the connection between the two formulations. In particular, since
we are assuming a discrete time model, then the “turn” (who is currently acting) will have to be
represented (at the very least) in X. Considering time to be event-based, however, we can still
handle interruptions, but simultaneous action by both agents will need further consideration2.
In the following, we will use symbolic indices in {a, b, c} and {e, p, a}, and define two simple index
dictionaries, dι and dα, to map between the symbols and numeric indices ({0,1,2}) in matrices
and vectors so that, dι(a) = 0, dι(b) = 1, dι(c) = 2 and dα(e) = 0, dα(p) = 1, dα(a) = 2. Thus, we
can write an element of F as Fbp which will be the k
th element of the vector representation of F,
where k = 3dι(b)+dα(p). A covariance in the space of F might be written Σ (a 9×9 matrix), and
the element at position (n,m) of this matrix would be denoted Σij,kl where n = 3dι(i) + dα(j)
and m = 3dι(k) + dα(l). We can then refer to the middle 3× 3 block of Σ (the covariance of Fb
with itself) as Σb·,b·. Although the extra indices seem burdensome, they will be useful later on
as we will see. We will also require an operator that combines two nine-dimensional sentiment
vectors w and z by selecting the first and last three elements (identity components) of w and
the middle three (behaviour) elements of z:
〈w, z〉 ≡
 wazb
wc
 . (2)
The POMDP action will be denoted here as B = {A,Ba} (behaviour of the agent), but this is
treated differently than other variables as the agent is assumed to have freedom to choose the
value for this variable. The action is factored into two parts: A is the propositional content of
the action, and includes things that the agent does to the application (change screens, present
exercises, etc), while Ba is the emotional content of the action. Thus, Ba gives the affective
“how” for the delivery “what” of an action, A. The affective action Ba = {Bae,Bap,Baa} will
also be continuous valued and three dimensional: the agent sets an EPA value for its action (not
2One method may be to have a dynamically changing environment noise: an agent cannot receive a commu-
nication from another agent if it is simultaneously using the same channel of communication, for example.
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a propositional action label)3. For example, a tutoring system may “command” a student to
do something (Ba = {−0.1, 1.3, 1.6}), or may “suggest” instead (Ba = {1.8, 1.4, 0.8, }), which
is considerably more “good” than the command. The client behaviour is implicitly represented
in the fundamental sentiment variables Fb (a three dimensional vector), and we make some
observations of this behaviour, Ωf , another three dimensional vector. The ACT databases can
be used to map words in written or spoken text to EPA values that are used as Ωf , for example.
Finally, a set of variables X represents the state of the system (e.g. the state of the computer
application or interface). We don’t assume that the system state or client behaviour are directly
observable, and so also use sets of observation variables Ωx. The state space described by X may
also include affective elements. For example, a student’s level of frustration could be explicitly
modeled within X. In Section 4.2.2, we describe an affective prompting system that is used
for a person with a cognitive disability. In this case, we explicitly represent the “awareness” of
the person as a component of X, and the “propositional” actions of prompting can change the
“awareness” of the person.
3.1.1 Transient Dynamics
The empirically derived prediction equations of ACT can be written as τ ′ = M(x)G (f ′, τ ,x)
where G is a non-linear operator that combines τ , f ′, and x, and M(X) is the prediction
matrix (see Section 2 and [21]) that now depends on whose “turn” it is (encapsulated in X so
that M(X) ≡ M(Xw), where Xw ∈ X and xw ∈ {agent, client}). More precisely, we write
Equation (11.16) in [21] as the function G for the case when it is the turn of the agent (as given
by xw) as the 29× 1 (column) vector:
G (f ′, τ , xw = agent) = [1 τae τap τaa f ′be f
′
bp f
′
ba τce τcp τca
τaef
′
be τaef
′
bp τaeτce τaeτcp τapf
′
be τapf
′
bp τapτcp
τapτca τaaf
′
ba τcef
′
be τcpf
′
be τcef
′
bp τcpf
′
bp τcaf
′
bp
τcpf
′
ba τaeτcef
′
be τaeτcpf
′
bp τapτcpf
′
bp τapτcaf
′
bp]
T (3)
and the case when it is the turn of the client is the same, but with agent and client indices
swapped on τ (so τa· → τc· and τc· → τa·):
G (f ′, τ , xw = client) = [1 τce τcp τca f ′be f
′
bp f
′
ba τae τap τaa
τcef
′
be τcef
′
bp τceτae τceτap τcpf
′
be τcpf
′
bp τcpτap
τcpτaa τcaf
′
ba τaef
′
be τapf
′
be τaef
′
bp τapf
′
bp τaaf
′
bp
τapf
′
ba τceτaef
′
be τceτapf
′
bp τcpτapf
′
bp τcpτaaf
′
bp]
T (4)
The terms in these two functions are arrived at through an experimental procedure detailed
in [73], but may change based on further experimental evidence. These two functions may also
depend on other parts of X (the “settings”, see Section 12.1 of [21]). M is then a 9× 29 matrix
of empirically derived coefficients that, when multiplied by these vectors, yields the subsequent
3There may be constraints in the action space that must be respected at planning and at decision-making
time. For example, you can’t give a student a really hard problem to solve in a way that will seem accommodat-
ing/submissive.
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transient sentiments. M must be a function of x, since we will swap all “actor” rows with
“object” rows when it is the client turn. Thus,
M(xw = agent) ≡M ≡
 Ma·Mb·
Mc·
 M(xw = client) ≡
 Mc·Mb·
Ma·

where M is from the ACT database.
In general, we can imagine G in Equations (3) and (4) as vectors with all possible products of
up to m elements from 〈τ , f ′〉. These are a set of “features” derived from the previous transients
and current fundamentals. M is then a 9 × 9m matrix of coefficients, many of which may be
very small or zero. Empirical studies have narrowed these down to the set above, using m = 3.
Ideally, we would like to learn the coefficients of M , and the features that are used in G , from
data during interactions.
Since G only uses the behaviour component of f ′, we can also group terms together and write
τ ′ = M(x)G (f ′, τ ,x) = H (τ ,x)f ′b − C (τ ,x), where H and C are 9× 3 and 9× 1 matrices of
coefficients from the dynamics M and G together. That is, Hij,k is the sum of all the terms in
row 3dι(i) + dα(j) of MG that contain f ′bk, with f
′
bk divided out. Thus, the sum of all terms in
row 3dι(i) + dα(j) of MG that contain f ′bk is Hij,kf
′
bk. Similarly, Cij is the sum of all terms in
row 3dι(i) + dα(j) of MG that contain no f ′b element at all. Simply put, the matrices H and
C are a refactoring of the operators MG , such that a linear function of f ′b is obtained.
We then postulate that the dynamics of τ ′ will follow this prediction exactly, so that the distri-
bution over τ ′ is deterministic and given by:
Pr(τ ′|τ , f ′,x) = δ(τ ′ − τ ) = δ(τ ′ −H (τ ,x)f ′b − C (τ ,x)), (5)
where
δ(x) =
{
1 if x = 0
0 otherwise
(6)
3.1.2 Deflection potential
The deflection in affect control theory is a nine-dimensional weighted Euclidean distance measure
between fundamental sentiments F and transient impressions T (Section 2). Here, we propose
that this distance measure is the logarithm of a probabilistic potential
ϕ(f ′, τ ′) ∝ e−(f ′−τ ′)TΣ−1(f ′−τ ′). (7)
The covariance Σ is a generalisation of the “weights” (Equation (1) and [21]), as it allows for
some sentiments to be more significant than others when making predictions (i.e. their deflec-
tions are more carefully controlled by the participants), but also represents correlations between
sentiments in general. If Σ is diagonal with elements 1wi , i ∈ {1, . . . , 9}, then Equation (7) gives
us logϕ(f ′, τ ′) = D + c where D is the deflection from Equation (1) and c is a constant.
3.1.3 Fundamental Dynamics
To predict the fundamental sentiments, we combine the deflection potential from the previous
section with an “inertial” term that stabilises the fundamentals over time. This gives the
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probabilistic generalisation of the affect control principle (Definition 1):
Pr(f ′|f , τ ,x,ba, ϕ) ∝ e−ψ(f ′,τ ,x)−ξ(f ′,f ,ba,x) (8)
where ψ(f ′, τ ,x) = (f ′ −M(x)G (f ′, τ ,x))TΣ−1(f ′ −M(x)G (f ′, τ ,x)) and ξ represents the temporal
“inertial” dynamics of f ′, encoding both the stability of affective identities and the dynamics
of affective behaviours. ξ is such that f ′b is equal to ba if the agent is acting, and otherwise is
unconstrained, and f ′a, f ′c are likely to be close to fa, fc, respectively. Equation (8) can be re-
written as a set of multivariate Gaussian distributions indexed by x, with means and covariances
that are non-linearly dependent on f ,ba and τ . The full derivation is in Section 3.3.
3.1.4 Other Factors
The other factors in BayesAct are as follows:
• R(f , τ ,x) is a reward function giving the immediate reward given to the agent. We assume
an additive function
R(a, f , τ ,x) = Rx(a,x) +Rs(f , τ ) (9)
where Rx encodes the application goals (e.g. to get a student to pass a test), and
Rs ∝ −(f − τ )2
depends on the deflection. The relative weighting and precise functional form of these two
reward functions require further investigation, but in the examples we show can be simply
defined. The affect control principle only considers Rs, and here we have generalised to
include other goals.
• Pr(x′|x, f ′, τ ′, a) denotes how the application progresses given the previous state, the
fundamental and transient sentiments, and the (propositional) action of the agent. The
dependence on the sentiments is important: it indicates that the system state will progress
differently depending on the affective state of the user and agent. In Section 4.2 we explore
this idea further in the context of two applications by hypothesising that the system state
will more readily progress towards a goal if the deflection (difference between fundamental
and transient sentiments) is low.
• Pr(ωf |f), P r(ωx|x) observation functions for the client behaviour sentiment and system
state, respectively. These functions are stochastic in general, but may be deterministic for
the system state (so that X is fully observable). It will not be deterministic for the client
behaviour sentiment as we have no way of directly measuring this (it can only be inferred
from data).
3.2 Transition Dynamics
Overall, we are interested in computing the transition probability over time: the probability
distribution over the sentiments and system state given the history of actions and observations.
Denoting S = {F,T,X}, and Ω = {Ωf ,Ωx}, and Ωt,bat,St are the observations, agent action,
and state at time t, we want to compute the agent’s subjective belief:
b(st) ≡ Pr(st|ω0, . . . ,ωt,ba0, . . . ,bat)
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which can be written as
b(st) =
∫
st−1
Pr(st, st−1|ω0, . . . ,ωt,ba0, . . . ,bat)
∝
∫
st−1
Pr(ωt|st)Pr(st|st−1,ω0, . . . ,ωt−1,ba0, . . . ,bat)Pr(st−1|ω0, . . . ,ωt−1,ba0, . . . ,bat)
= Pr(ωt|st)
∫
st−1
Pr(st|st−1,bat)b(st−1)
= Pr(ωt|st)Eb(st−1) [Pr(st|st−1,bat)] (10)
where Pr(st|st−1,bt) factored according to Figure 1(b):
Pr(st|...) = Pr(x′|x, f ′, τ ′, a)Pr(τ ′|τ , f ′,x)Pr(f ′|f , τ ,x,ba) (11)
This gives us a recursive formula for computing the distribution over the state at time t as an
expectation of the transition dynamics taken with respect to the distribution state at time t−1.
Now, we have that and Pr(ω|s) = Pr(ωx|x′)Pr(ωf |f ′) and rewriting st ≡ s′ and st−1 ≡ s, we
have:
b(s′) = Pr(ωx|x′)Pr(ωf |f ′)Eb(s)
[
Pr(f ′, τ ′,x′|f , τ ,x,ba, a)
]
= Pr(ωx|x′)Pr(ωf |f ′)Eb(s)
[
Pr(x′|x, f ′, τ ′, a)Pr(τ ′|τ , f ′,x)Pr(f ′|f , τ ,x,ba)
]
(12)
The first four terms correspond to parameters of the model as explained in the last section, while
we need to develop a method for computing the last term, which we do in the next section.
The belief state can be used to compute expected values of quantities of interest defined on the
state space, such as the expected deflection
Eb(s)[D(s)] =
∫
s
b(s)D(s), (13)
where D(s) is the deflection of s. This gives us a way to connect more closely with emotional
“labels” from appraisal theories. For example, if one wanted to compute the expected value of
an emotion such as “Joy” in a situation with certain features (expectedness, events, persons,
times), then the emotional content of that situation would be explicitly represented in our
model as a distribution over the E-P-A space, b(s), and the expected value of “Joy” would be
Eb(s)[Joy(s)] =
∫
s b(s)Joy(s), where Joy(s) is the amount of joy produced by the fundamental
and transient sentiment state s. In ACT, emotions are posited to arise from the difference
between the transient and fundamental impressions of self-identity (τa and fa, respectively, in
BayesAct). A separate set of equations with parameters obtained through empirical studies is
presented in Chapter 14 of [21], and emotional states (e.g. the function Joy(s)) can be computed
directly using these equations. Emotional displays (e.g. facial expressions) can be viewed as
a method for communicating an agent’s current appraisal of the situation in terms of affective
identities that the agent perceives, and would be part of the action space ba. The perception
of emotional displays would be simply integrated into BayesAct using observations of client
identity, Fc. We do not further expand on direct emotion measures in this paper, but note
that this may give a principled method for incorporating explicit appraisal mechanisms into
BayesAct, and for linking with appraisal theories [39].
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3.3 Estimating Behaviour Sentiment Probabilities
Here we describe how to compute Pr(f ′|f , τ ,x,ba). This is the agent’s prediction of what the
client will do next, and is based partly on the principle that we expect the client to do what is
optimal to reduce deflection in the future, given the identities of agent and client.
We denote the probability distribution of interest as a set of parameters Θf . Each parameter
in this set, θf , will be a probability of observing a value of f
′ given values for f , τ ,ba and x.
We write θf (f
′; f , τ ,x,ba) = Pr(f ′|f , τ ,x,ba,θf ), so that the distribution over θf given the
knowledge that τ ′ and f ′ are related through ϕ(f , τ ) is4:
Pr(θf |ϕ) ∝
∫
f ′,τ ′,ba
f ,τ ,x
Pr(θf , f
′, τ ′,ba, f , τ ,x, ϕ) (14)
=
∫
f ′,τ ′,ba
f ,τ ,x
ϕ(f ′, τ ′)Pr(τ ′|x, f ′, τ )Pr(f ′|f , τ ,x,ba,θf )
Pr(θf )Pr(f)Pr(τ )Pr(x)Pr(ba) (15)
=
∫
f ′,τ ′,ba
f ,τ ,x
e−(f
′−τ ′)TΣ−1(f ′−τ ′)Pr(τ ′|x, f ′, τ )θf (f ′; f , τ ,x,ba)Pr(θf ) (16)
where by
∫
z we mean
∫
z∈Z (Z is the domain of Z) and we have left off the infinitesimals (e.g.
df ′, dτ ′). We have assumed even priors over f ,τ , x and ba. The expression (16) will give us a
posterior update to the parameters of the distribution over θf .
Equation (16) gives the general form for this distribution, but this can be simplified by using the
determinism of some of the distributions involved, as described at the start of this section. The
deterministic function for the distribution over τ ′ will select specific values for these variables,
and we find that:
Pr(θf |ϕ) ∝
∫
f ′,ba
f ,τ ,x
e−ψ(f
′,τ ,x)θf (f
′; f , τ ,x,ba)Pr(θf ) (17)
where
ψ(f ′, τ ,x) = (f ′ −MG (f ′, τ ,x))TΣ−1(f ′ −MG (f ′, τ ,x)) (18)
is the deflection between fundamental and transient sentiments.
Equation (17) gives us an expression for a distribution over θf , which we can then use to
estimate a distribution over F′ = f ′ given the state {f , τ ,x,ba} and the known relation between
4We are postulating an undirected link in the graph between τ and f . An easy way to handle this undirected
link properly is to replace it with an equivalent set of directed links by adding a new Boolean variable, D, that
is conditioned by both T and F, and such that Pr(D = True|τ , f) ∝ ϕ(τ , f). We then set D = True because we
have the knowledge that T and F are related through ϕ(F,T), and the quantity of interest is Pr(θf |D = True).
In the text, we use the shorthand Pr(θf |ϕ) to avoid having to introduce D.
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fundamentals and transients, ϕ (ignoring the observations Ωf and Ωx for now):
Pr(f ′|f , τ ,x,ba, ϕ) ∝
∫
θf ,τ ′
Pr(θf , f
′, f , τ ′, τ ,x,ba, ϕ) (19)
=
∫
θf
e−ψ(f
′,τ ,x)θf (f
′; f , τ ,x,ba)Pr(θf |x) (20)
= e−ψ(f
′,τ ,x)
∫
θf
θf (f
′; f , τ ,x,ba)Pr(θf |x) (21)
= e−ψ(f
′,τ ,x)
[
EPr(θf |x)(θf )
]
(22)
The first term is a distribution over f ′ that represents our assumption of minimal deflection,
while the second is the expected value of the parameter θf given the prior. This expectation
will give us the most likely value of θf given only the system state x. We know two things
about the transition dynamics (θf ) that we can encode in the prior. First, we know that the
behaviour will be set equal to the agent’s action if it is the agent’s turn (hence the dependence
on x). Second, we know that identities are not expected to change very quickly. Therefore, we
have that
EPr(θf |x)(θf ) ∝ e−(f
′−〈f ,ba〉)TΣ−1f (x)(f ′−〈f ,ba〉) (23)
where 〈f ,ba〉 is f for the identities and ba for the behaviours, and Σf (x) is the covariance matrix
for the inertia of the fundamentals, including the setting of behaviour fundamentals by the agent
action. Σf is a set of parameters governing the strength of our prior beliefs that the identities
of client and agent will remain constant over time5. Thus, Σf is a 9× 9 block matrix:
Σf (x) =
 I3β2a 0 00 I3β2b (x) 0
0 0 I3β
2
c
 (24)
where β2a and β
2
c are the variances of agent and client identity fundamentals (i.e. how much we
expect agent and client to change their identities over time), and β2b (x) is infinite for a client
turn and is zero for an agent turn. Writing ξ(f ′, f ,ba,x) ≡ (f ′ − 〈f ,ba〉)TΣ−1f (x)(f ′ − 〈f ,ba〉),
we therefore have that:
Pr(f ′|f , τ ,x,ba, ϕ) ∝ e−ψ(f ′,τ ,x)−ξ(f ′,f ,ba,x) (25)
We can now estimate the most likely value of F′ by computing
F′∗ = arg max
f ′
Pr(f ′|f , τ ,x,ba, ϕ).
This expression will be maximized for exactly the behaviour that minimizes the deflection as
given by ψ, tempered by the inertia of changing identities given by ξ. This is the generalisation
of the affect control principle (Definition 1, see also Appendix A). We can rewrite this by first
rewriting the matrix H as
H =
 HaHb
Hc

5It may also be the case that ba can change the agent identity directly, so that ba is six-dimensional and
〈f ,ba〉 = [ba, fc]T .
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where Ha ≡Ha·· (a 3× 3 matrix giving the rows of H in which Hij,k have i = a) and similarly
for Hb and Hc. We also define I3 as the 3× 3 identity matrix and 03 as the 3× 3 matrix of all
zeros. We can then write a matrix
K =
 I3 −Ha 0303 I3 −Hb 03
03 −Hc I3

Using K , we can now write the general form for ψ starting from Equation (18) as:
ψ(f ′, τ ,x) = (f ′ −H (τ ,x)f ′b − C (τ ,x))TΣ−1(f ′ −H (τ ,x)f ′b − C (τ ,x)) (26)
= (K f ′ − C )TΣ−1(K f ′ − C ) (27)
= (f ′ −K −1C )TK TΣ−1K (f ′ −K −1C ) (28)
and thus, if we ignore the inertia from previous fundamentals, ξ, we recognize Equation (25) as
the expectation of a Gaussian or normal distribution with a mean of K −1C and a covariance
of Στ ≡ K −1Σ(K T )−1. Taking ξ into account means that we have a product of Gaussians,
itself also a Gaussian the mean and covariance of which can be simply obtained by completing
the squares to find a covariance, Σn equal to the sum in quadrature of the covariances, and a
mean, µn, that is proportional to a weighted sum of K −1C and 〈f ,ba〉, with weights given by
the normalised covariances of ΣnΣ
−1
τ and ΣnΣ
−1
f , respectively.
Putting it all together, we have that
Pr(f ′|f , τ ,x,ba, ϕ) ∝ e−(f ′−µn)TΣ
−1
n (f
′−µn) (29)
where
µn = ΣnK
T (τ ,x)Σ−1C (τ ,x) + ΣnΣ−1f (x)〈f ,ba〉 (30)
Σn = (K
T (τ ,x)Σ−1K (τ ,x) + Σ−1f (x))
−1. (31)
The distribution over f ′ in Equation (29) is a Gaussian distribution, but has a mean and covari-
ance that are dependent on f , τ ,x and ba through the non-linear function K . Thus, is is not
simple to use this analytically as we will explore further below.
The “optimal” behaviour from [21] is obtained by holding the identities constant when optimising
the behaviour (and similarly for identities: behaviours are held constant). See Appendix B for
a reduction of the equations above to those in [21].
3.4 Computing Policies
The goal here is to compute a policy pi(b(S)) : ∆(S) → A that maps distributions over S into
actions, where b(S) is the current belief state as given by Equation (12). This policy is a function
from functions (distributions) over a continuous space into the mixed continuous-discrete action
space. There are two components to this mapping. First, there is the propositional action as
defined by the original POMDP, and second there is the affective action defined by affect control
theory.
Policies for POMDPs in general can be computed using a number of methods, but recent progress
in using Monte-Carlo (sampling) based methods has shown that very large POMDPs can be
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(approximately) solved tractably, and that this works equally well for continuous state and
observation spaces [48,69]. POMCP [69] is a Monte-Carlo based method for computing policies
in POMDPs with discrete action and observation spaces. The continuous observation space
can be handled by discretising the set of observations obtained at each step. This can be done
dynamically or using a fixed grid. The continuous action space for BayesAct can be handled by
leveraging the fact the we can predict what an agent would “normally” do in any state according
to the affect control principle: it is the action that minimises the deflection. Given the belief
state b(s), we have a probability distribution over the action space giving the probability of each
action (see Equation (32)). This normative prediction constrains the space of actions over which
the agent must plan, and drastically reduces the branching factor of the search space.
Denote the “normal” or expected affective action distribution as pi†(s) = pi†(fb):
pi†(f ′b) =
∫
f ′a,f ′c
∫
s
Pr(f ′|f , τ ,x, ϕ)b(s) =
∫
f ′a,f ′c
∫
s
e−(f
′−µ†n)T (Σ†n)−1(f ′−µ†n)b(s) (32)
where
µ†n = Σ
†
nK
T (τ ,x)Σ−1C (τ ,x) + Σ†n(Σ
†
f (x))
−1f , (33)
Σ†n = (K
T (τ ,x)Σ−1K (τ ,x) + (Σ†f (x))
−1)−1, (34)
and Σ†f is the same as Σf given by Equation (24) with β
2
b (x) set to infinity (instead of zero) so the
behaviour sentiments are unconstrained. Equation (32) computes the expected distribution over
f ′ given b(s) and then marginalises (sums) out the identity components6 to get the distribution
over fb. A sample drawn from this distribution could then be used as an action in the POMCP
method. A POMCP “rollout” would then proceed by drawing a subsequent sample from the
distribution over client actions, and then repeating the sampling from Equation (32) over agent
actions. This is continued to some maximum depth, at which point the reward gathered is
computed as the value of the path taken. The propositional actions that update the state x are
handled exhaustively as usual in POMCP by looping over them.
The integration in Equation (32) may be done analytically if b(s) is Gaussian, but for the general
case this may be challenging and not have a closed-form solution. In such cases, we can make a
further approximation that b(s) = δ(s∗ − s) where s∗ = {f∗, τ ∗,x∗} = Eb(s)[s] =
∫
s sb(s) is the
expected state (or one could use s∗ = arg maxs b(s) as the most likely state). We will denote
the resulting action distribution as pi†∗(f ′b).
In this paper, we don’t use the full POMCP solution, instead only taking a “greedy” action
that looks one step into the future by drawing samples from the “normal” action distribution
in Equation (32) using these to compute the expected next reward, and selecting the (sampled)
action ba
†∗ that maximizes this:
ba
†∗ = arg max
ba
∫
s′
[
Pr(x′|x∗, f ′, τ ′,ba)Pr(τ ′|τ ∗, f ′,x∗)Pr(f ′|f∗, τ ∗,x∗,ba)R(f ′, τ ′,x′)ds′, ba ∼ pi†∗(s′)
]
(35)
In practice we make two further simplifications: we avoid the integration over fa and fc in
Equation (32) by drawing samples from the distribution over f ′ and selecting the f ′b components
as our sample for ba in Equation (35), and we compute the integration in Equation (35) by
sampling from the integrand and averaging.
6If the agent is able to “set” its own identity, then the integration would be only over f ′c, the client identity.
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3.5 Sampling
We return now to Equation (10) and consider how we can compute the belief distribution at
each point in time. The nonlinearities in the transition dynamics that arise from the dynamics
of fundamental sentiments (Equation (29)) prevent the use of an extended (or simple) Kalman
filter. Instead, we will find it more convenient and general to represent b(s) using a set of N
samples [14]. This will allow us to represent more complex belief distributions, including, but
not limited to multi-modal distributions over identities. This can be very useful in cases where
the agent believes the client to be one of a small number of identities with equal probability. In
such a case, the agent can maintain multiple hypotheses, and slowly shift its belief towards the
one that agrees most with the evidence accrued during an interaction. We will write the belief
state as [14]:
b(s) ∝
N∑
i=1
wiδ(s− si), (36)
where si = {fi, τi, xi} and wi is the weight of the ith sample.
Then, we implement Equation (10) using a sequential Monte Carlo method sampling technique,
also known as a particle filter or bootstrap filter [14, 19]. We start at time t = 0 with a set
of samples and weights {si, wi}i=1...N , which together define a belief state b(s0) according to
Equation (36). The precise method of getting the first set of samples is application dependent,
but will normally be to draw the samples from a Gaussian distribution over the identities of the
agent and client (with variances of β0a and β
0
c , resp.), and set all weights to 1.0. The agent then
proceeds as follows:
1. Consult the policy to retrieve a new action ba ← pi(b(st)). If using the approximation in
Equation (35), then we first compute the expected value of the state s∗t =
∑N
i=1wisi.
2. Take action ba and receive observation ω.
3. Sample (with replacement) unweighted samples from b(s) from the distribution defined by
the current weights.
4. For each unweighted sample, si, draw a new sample, s
′
i from the posterior distribution
Pr(·|si,ba):
(a) draw a sample f ′ from Equation (29) (this is a draw from a multivariate normal, and
will likely be a bottleneck for the sampling method),
(b) draw a sample τ ′ from Equation (5) (this is deterministic so is an easy sample to
draw),
(c) draw a sample x′ from Pr(x′|x, f ′, τ ′, a) (application dependent)
5. Compute new weights for each sample using the observation functions wi = Pr(ω|s′i)
6. If all weights are 0.0, set fb = ω and resample.
7. The new belief state is b(s′) according to Equation 36 with samples, where s′i = {f ′i , τ ′i ,x′i}
goto step 1 with s← s′.
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An example of the sampling step 4 is shown above to be from a proposal that is exactly
Pr(f ′|f , τ ,x,ba, ϕ), but this could be from some other distribution close to this.
We can compute expected values of quantities of interest, such as the deflection, by summing
over the weighted set of samples (the Monte-Carlo version of Equation (13)):
d(f , τ ) =
N∑
i=1
wi(fi − τi)2 (37)
We have found that, for situations in which the client identity is not known, but is being inferred
by the agent, it is necessary to add some “roughening” to the distribution over these unknown
identities [19]. This is because the initial set of samples only sparsely covers the identity space
(for an unknown identity), and so is very unlikely to come close to the true identity. Coupled
with the underlying assumption that the identities are fixed or very slowly changing, this results
in the particle filter getting “stuck” (and collapsed) at whatever initial sample was closest to the
true identity (which may still be far off in the EPA space, especially when using fewer particles).
Adding some zero-mean white noise (in [−σr, σr]) helps solve this degeneracy. We add this noise
to any unknown identity (agent or client) after the unweighted samples are drawn in step 3
above. As suggested by [19], we use σr = K ×N−1/d, where K is a constant, N is the number
of samples and d is the dimension of the search space (in this case 3 for the unknown identity.
We use K = 1 in our experiments, and note that we are not using white noise (not Gaussian
noise), but that this does not make a significant difference.
This so-called “roughening” procedure is well known in the sequential Monte-Carlo literature,
and in particular has been used for Bayesian parameter estimation [14] (Chapter 10). Our
situation is quite similar, as the client identities can be seen as model parameters that are fixed,
but unknown. Finally, it may also be possible to change the amount of roughening noise that is
added, slowly reducing it according to some schedule as the client identity is learned.
It is also possible to mix exact inference over the application state, X, with sampling over the
continuous affective space, leading to a Rao-Blackwellised particle filter [15].
3.6 Python Implementation
We have implemented BayesAct in Python as a class Agent that contains all the necessary meth-
ods7. Applications can use BayesAct by subclassing Agent and providing three key application-
dependent methods:
• sampleXvar is used to draw a sample from X
• reward produces the reward in the current state of X
• initXvar is used to initialise X at the start of a simulation or run
Sub-classes can also implement methods for input and output mappings. For example, an input
mapping function could take sentences in English and map them to EPA values based on an
affective dictionary, or using sentiment analysis [43]. Applications can also learn these mappings
7The code is obtainable through the webpage http://www.cs.uwaterloo.ca/~jhoey/research/bayesact.
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by assuming the human user will be behaving according to the affect control principle: whatever
the user says can be mapped to the prediction of the theory (or close to it).
On top of the functions above for a sub-class of Agent, the following parameters need to be set
when using BayesAct in general:
param. default meaning
α 1.0 variance of a diagonal uniform Σ, the deflection potential covariance.
(larger means the affect control principle is not as strong)
βa 0.01 identity inertia for agent
(larger means agent shifts identities more)
βc 0.01 identity inertia for client
(larger means agent thinks client will be shifting identities more)
β0a 0.01 initial identity variance for agent
(larger means agent is more uncertain of its own identity)
β0c 0.01 initial identity variance for client
(larger means agent is more uncertain of client’s identity)
γ 1.0 model environment noise variance
γd 0.9 discount factor (if needed)
N 300 number of samples
σr N
−1/3 roughening noise
4 Experiments and Results
Our goal in this section is to demonstrate, in simulation, that BayesAct can discover the affective
identities of persons it interacts with, and that BayesAct can augment practical applications with
affective dynamics. To establish these claims, we do the following.
First, we verify both analytically and empirically that BayesAct can reproduce exactly the
affective dynamics predicted by the Interact software [21]. The analytical derivation is done
by reducing Equation (29) to the equations in [21] as shown in Appendix B. The empirical
demonstration is done by running BayesAct alongside Interact8 and showing that the identical
sentiments and actions are generated. We have found a very close match across a range of
different agent and client identities. These analytical and empirical demonstrations show that
BayesAct can be used as a model of human affective dynamics to the extent that it has been
shown empirically that Interact is a close model of human affective dynamics. Second, we show
how, if we loosen the constraints on the client identity being fixed, BayesAct can “discover” or
learn this identity during an interaction with an Interact client. Third, we show how, if both
agent and client do not know the identity of their interactant, they can both learn this identity
simultaneously. Fourth, we show that a BayesAct agent can adapt to a changing client identity.
What this means is that an affective agent has the ability to learn the affective identity of a client
that it interacts with. We demonstrate this under varying levels of environment noise. Finally,
we postulate that, since the agent can learn the affective identity of its client, it can better serve
the client in an appropriate and effective manner. We give two preliminary demonstrations of
this in Section 4.2.
8see http://www.indiana.edu/~socpsy/ACT. We used the Indiana 04-05 database for identities and be-
haviours and the USA 1978 equations for dynamics.
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4.1 Simulations
In this section, we investigate two types of simulation. The first concerns agents with nearly
fixed (low variance) personal identities that try to learn the identity of another agent. The
second shows what happens if one of the agents is changing identity dynamically. Full results
are shown in Appendix C. To enable comparisons with Interact, we use action selection ac-
cording to our generalised affect control principle only, using an average of 100 samples from
Equation (32). These simulations therefore do not directly address how policy computation
will affect an application. However, we can show that BayesAct can replicate Interact as far as
deflection minimisation goes, and can find low-deflection solutions for many examples, without
requiring identities to be known and fixed. We have also done simulations where Equation (35)
is used with a reward function that sets Rx = 0 (see Equation (9)). These results do not show
any significant differences, meaning that Equation (32) is sufficient for cases where Rx = 0.
Videos showing dynamics of the simulations can be seen at bayesact.ca.
4.1.1 Static identities
Here we explore the case where two agents know their own self identities (so β0a = 0.001) but
don’t know the identity of the other agent (so β0c is set to the variance of all identities in the
database). We run 20 trials, and in each trial a new identity is chosen for each of agent and
client. These two identities are independently sampled from the distribution of identities in
the ACT database and are the personal identities for each agent and client. Then, agent and
client BayesAct models are initialised with Fa set to this personal identity, Fc (identity of the
other) set to the mean of the identities in the database, [0.4, 0.4, 0.5]. Fb is set to zeros, but this
is not important as it plays no role in the first update. The simulation proceeds according to
the procedure in Section 3.5 for 50 steps. Agents take turns acting, and actions are conveyed to
the other agent with the addition of some zero-mean normally distributed “environment” noise,
with standard deviation σe. Agents use Gaussian observation models with uniform covariances
with diagonal variances γ = max(0.5, σe). We perform 10 simulations per trial with βc = 0.001
for both agent and client. All agents use roughening noise σr = N
−1/3 where N is the number
of samples. We use id-deflection to denote the sum of squared differences between one agent’s
estimate of the other agent’s identity, and that other agent’s estimate of its own identity.
Figure 2 shows a plot of the mean (over 20 trials) of the average (over 10 experiments) final
(at the last step) id-deflection and total deflection as a function of the environment noise, σe,
and sample numbers, N , for one of the agents (the other is symmetric). Also shown are the
average of the maximum total deflections for all experiments in a trial. We see that only about
50 samples are needed to get a solution that is robust to environment noise up to σe = 2.0.
This corresponds to enough noise to make a behaviour of “apprehend” be mis-communicated
as “confide in”9. Further examples of behaviours for different levels of deflection are shown in
Table 3 (Appendix C). Surprisingly, deflection is not strongly affected by environment noise.
One way to explain this is that, since the agent has a correct model of the environment noise
(γ = σe), it is able to effectively average the noisy measurements and still come up with a
reasonably low deflection solution. The deterministic program Interact would have more trouble
in these situations, as it must “believe” exactly what it gets (it has no model of environment
9However, we are comparing the expected values of identities which may be different than any mode.
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noise).
Average deflection does not change significantly with the sample size, whereas maximum de-
flection decreases (although not strictly monotonically). The deflections however have relatively
high variance (e.g. 6.6 ± 2.7 for σe = 1.0 and N = 5), and so the maximum deflections would
likely become a smoother function of sample size if the number of trials was increased. Table 4
in Appendix C shows the full results with standard deviations.
Figure 2(d) shows a sample set after 7 iterations of one experiment, clearly showing the multi-
modal distributions centered around the true identities (triangles) of each interactant10. These
sample sets normally converge to near the true identities after about 15 iterations or less.
Figures 3 looks more closely at four of the trials done with N = 200 samples.The red and blue
lines show the agent- and client- id-deflection (solid) and agent and client deflections (dashed),
respectively, while the black line shows the deflections using Interact (which has the correct and
fixed identities for both agents at all times). BayesAct allows identities to change, and starts
with almost no information about the identity of the other interactant (for both agent and
client). We can see that our model gets at least as low a deflection as Interact. In Figure 3(a),
the agent had Fa = [2.7, 1.5, 0.9], and the client had Fa = [−2.1, −1.3, −0.2], and σe = 0 (noise-free
communication). These two identities do not align very well11, and result in high deflection when
identities are known and fixed in Interact (black line). BayesAct rapidly estimates the correct
identities, and tracks the deflection of Interact. Figure 3(b) is the same, but with σe = 1.0.
We see that BayesAct is robust to this level of noise. Figure 3(c) shows a simulation between
a “tutor” (Fa = [1.5, 1.5, −0.2]) and a “student” (Fc = [1.5, 0.3, 0.8]) with σe = 1.0. Here we
see that Interact predicts larger deflections can occur. BayesAct also gets a larger deflection,
but manages to resolve it early on in the simulation. Identities are properly learned in this case
as well. Figure 2(d) has the same identities as Figure 2(c), but with σe = 5.0. We see that
BayesAct is unable to find the true identity at this (extreme) level of noise.
4.1.2 Dynamic (Changing) Identities
We now experiment with how BayesAct can respond to agents that change identities dynamically
over the course of an interaction. We use the following setup: the client has two identities (chosen
randomly for each trial) that it shifts between every 20 steps. It shifts from one to the other
in a straight line in E-P-A space, at a speed of sid. That is, it moves a distance of sid along
the vector from its current identity to the current target identity. It stops once it reaches the
target (so the last step may be shorter than sid). It waits at the target location for T steps and
then starts back to the original identity. It continues doing this for 200 steps. Our goal here
is to simulate an agent that is constantly switching between two identities, but is doing so at
different speeds. Table 5 and Table 6 in Appendix C show the full results for these simulations.
We first show that BayesAct can respond to a single shift in identity after the first 20 steps
(so after that, T = ∞). Figure 4(a) shows the mean number of time steps per sequence of
200 steps in which the id-deflection of the agent’s estimate of the client’s identity is greater
than a threshold, dm, for σe = 0.5. The results show that BayesAct is able to maintain a
10see also videos at http://www.cs.uwaterloo.ca/~jhoey/research/bayesact/.
11These identities are closest to “lady” and “shoplifter” for agent and client respectively, but recall that identity
labels come from mapping the computed EPA vectors to concepts in ACT databases [22] and are not used by
BayesAct.
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Figure 2: Deflections of identities from simulations with different numbers of samples (N),
and environment noise, σe. Roughening noise: σr = N
−1/3, model environment noise: γ =
max(0.5, σe). Left column: agent; right column: client. (a) id-deflection; (b) mean deflection;
(c) max deflection. (d) shows samples (squares) and true identities (triangles) after 7 iterations
for one trial.
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Figure 3: Closer look at four 200 sample experiments showing id-deflection (solid lines), total
deflections (dashed lines) and deflection from Interact in dotted black (red=agent, blue=client).
(a) agent: Fa = [2.7, 1.5, 0.9], client: Fa = [−2.1,−1.3,−0.2], σe = 0; (b) as (a) but with
σe = 1.0; (c) agent: Fa = [1.5, 1.5,−0.2], client: Fc = [1.5, 0.3, 0.8], σe = 1.0. (d) same as (c)
but with σe = 5.0
low id-deflection throughout the sequence when confronted with speeds up to about 0.1. At
this setting (sid = σe = 0.1), only 4 frames (out of 200) have an id-deflection greater than 1.0.
Figure 4(b) shows a specific example where the client shifts between two identities, for sid = 0.25
and T = 40. The agent’s estimates of Fe are seen to follow the client’s changes, although the
agent lags behind by about 30 time steps.
4.2 Intelligent Interactive System Examples
In this section, we give two examples where BayesAct is used to expand intelligent interactive
systems. These examples are presented primarily to demonstrate that BayesAct can be easily
integrated into a range of different intelligent systems. We first discuss an exam practice assistant
that presents students with questions from the graduate record examination, and allows the
student to respond affectively. The second example is a cognitive orthosis that can help a
person with Alzheimer’s disease to wash their hands.
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Figure 4: (a) Number of frames (out of 200) where id-deflection is greater than dm = 1.0, 2.0
for continual shift identity experiments, for N = 100, T = 20, σe = 0.5. (b) Fundamental
identity sentiments Fe of client (green, dashed line) and agent’s estimate of client’s identity
(red, solid line) for an example where the client shifts identities at a speed of sid = 0.25 and
remains at each of two target identities for 40 steps. agent id is [0.32, 0.42, 0.65] and client ids
are [−1.54,−0.38, 0.13] and [1.31, 2.75,−0.09].
4.2.1 Exam Practice Application
We built a simple tutoring application in which the identities for agent and client are initially
set to “tutor” (Fa = [1.5, 1.5, −0.2]) and “student” (Fc = [1.5, 0.3, 0.8]), respectively, with low
dynamics variances of βa = βc = 0.01 and σr = 0.0 (see Section 3.3). Screenshots are shown
in Figure 5. The application asks sample questions from the Graduate Record Exam (GRE)
educational testing system, and the client clicks on a multiple-choice answer. The agent provides
feedback as to whether the client’s answer is correct. The client then has the opportunity to
”speak” by clicking on a labelled button (e.g., ”awwww come on that was too hard!”). The
statement maps to a value for Fb determined in an empirical survey described below (in this
case [−1.4, −0.8, −0.5]). BayesAct then computes an appropriate agent action, i.e. a vector in EPA
space, which maps to the closest of a set of statements elicited in the same survey (e.g., ”Sorry,
I may have been too demanding on you.”).
The tutor has three discrete elements of state X = {Xd, Xs, Xt} where Xd is the difficulty
level, Xs is the skill level of the student and Xt is the turn. Xd and Xs have 3 integer “levels”
where lower values indicate easier difficulty/lower skill. This is a simplified version of the models
explored by Brunskill [6], and Theocharous [77]. We use this simpler version in order to focus
our attention specifically on the affective reasoning components. The tutor’s model of the
student’s progress is P (X ′s = xs|xs, f , τ ′) = 0.9 with the remaining probability mass distributed
evenly over skill levels that differ by 1 from xs. The dynamics for all values where X
′
s ≤ xs
are then multiplied by (f ′ − τ ′)2/2 and renormalised. As deflection grows, the student is less
likely to increase in skill level and more likely to decrease. Thus, skill level changes inversely
proportionally to deflection. The tutor gets observations of whether the student succeeded/failed
(Ωx = 1/0), and has an observation function P (Ωx|Xd, Xs) that favours success if Xd (the
difficulty level) matches Xs (the skill level).The reward is the sum of the negative deflection as
in Equation (9) and Rx(x) = −(x − 2)2. It uses the approximate policy given (Section 3.4)
by Equation (35) for its affective response, and a simple heuristic policy for its propositional
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Figure 5: Tutoring interface screenshots
response where it gives an exercise at the same difficulty level as the mean (rounded) skill level
of the student 90% of the time, and an exercise one difficulty level higher 10% of the time.
Further optimisations of this policy as described in Section 3.4 would take into account how the
student would learn in the longer term.
We thus require a specification of the POMDP, and two mappings, one from the combination
of client statement button labels and difficulty levels to ACT behaviours (of client), and the
other from ACT behaviours (of agent) to difficulty level changes and statements to the stu-
dent. We conducted an empirical online survey of 37 participants (22 female) to establish these
mappings. Full survey results are shown in Appendix D. Table 1 shows a few examples of the
statements, along with the best behaviour label and the EPA values from the ACT database.
The relationships between the statements and behaviour labels are very clear in most cases.
We conducted a pilot experiment with 20 participants (7 female) who were mostly undergraduate
students of engineering or related disciplines (avg. age: 25.8). We compared the experiences of
10 users interacting with the BayesAct tutor with those of 10 users interacting with a control
tutor whose affective actions were selected randomly from the same set as the BayesAct tutor.
The control tutor is identical to the BayesAct tutor (it uses the same POMDP for estimating
student skill level, deflection, etc), except that it uses a policy for the affective component of
its action (Ba) that is a random choice, rather than according to Equation (35)
12. The control
tutor uses the same heuristic policy for the propositional action (selection of difficulty level) as
the BayesAct tutor.
Participants completed a short survey after using the system for an average of 20 minutes.
Results are displayed in Table 2. Users seemed to experience the flow of communication with
the BayesAct tutor as more simple, flexible, and natural than with the random control tutor.
The mean deflection for BayesAct was 2.9± 2.1 while for random it was 4.5± 2.2. We have to
treat these results from a small sample with caution, but this pilot study identified many areas
for improvement, and the results in Table 2 are encouraging.
12BayesAct used 500 samples, βa=βc=0.01, and took 4 seconds per interaction on an AMD phenom IIx4
955 3.20 GHz with 8GB RAM running Windows 7, while displaying the words “Thinking...”. The random tutor
simply ignored the computed response (but still did the computation so the time delay was the same) and then
chose at random.
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expression behaviour E P A
client expressions/client correct
awwww come on that was toooo hard . whine to -1.23 1.27 0.31
bah - give me something harder brag to -0.42 1.69 1.35
You are an amazing tutor. praise 2.96 2.5 1.5
client expressions/client incorrect
awwww come on that was toooo hard. Give me something easier beseech -1.75 0.65 0
Whatever, I’m still so proud of myself defend -1.58 0.09 0.13
Stupid computer program!! yell at -2.75 0.92 -0.21
You are not an effective teaching tool! criticize -2.65 1.35 -0.13
agent expressions/client correct
Great going! Here’s another one encourage 3.38 2.62 1.93
Wow - amazing work. Here’s an easy one for you reward 2.9 1.63 1.6
I really hope you are enjoying this exercise care for 1.37 0.63 -0.1
agent expressions/client incorrect
I wonder if you are just too stupid for this insult -3.41 1.67 0.31
Come on, a little more concentration, OK? admonish -1.52 1.33 0.81
Sorry, I may have been too demanding on you apologize 0.3 0.85 0.48
I don’t think you work hard enough. Reconsider your attitude! blame -2.78 1.15 1
Can we do this a little quicker now? hurry -0.74 0.78 1.07
Table 1: Some of the expressions elicited from the survey that were used in the tutoring
application, along with the best behaviour label match and the EPA values from the survey.
survey question BACT rand. T p
Communicating with MathTutor was similar 2.10 1.70 0.87 n.s.
to communicating with a human.
The tutor acted as if it understood my mood 2.80 2.00 1.92 < .05
and feelings while I was solving the problems it gave me.
I felt emotionally connected with MathTutor. 2.50 2.00 1.00 n.s.
I enjoyed interacting with MathTutor. 3.30 3.10 0.44 n.s.
MathTutor acted as if it knew what kind of person I am. 2.90 2.11 1.55 < .10
MathTutor gave awkward and inappropriate responses 3.44 4.50 -2.70 < .01
to how I solved the problems (reverse coded)
I found MathTutor to be flexible to interact with. 3.00 1.90 2.18 < .05
Using MathTutor would improve my skills in the long term. 3.40 2.00 2.49 < .05
The dialogue was simple and natural. 3.50 2.00 3.14 < .01
Overall, I am satisfied with this system. 2.70 1.70 2.34 < .05
Table 2: User study results. T has df=18 and p is one-tailed. Scales ranged from 1 (=not true)
to 5 (=true). (bact=BayesAct)
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4.2.2 Cognitive Assistant
Persons with dementia (PwD, e.g. Alzheimer’s disease) have difficutly completing activities
of daily living, such as handwashing, preparing food and dressing. The short-term memory
impairment that is a hallmark of Alzheimer’s disease leaves sufferers unable to recall what
step to do next, or what important objects look like, for example. In previous work, we have
developed a POMDP-based agent called the COACH that can assist PwD by monitoring the
person and providing audio-visual cues when the person gets “stuck” [24]. The COACH is
effective at monitoring and making decisions about when/what to prompt [37]. However, the
audio-visual prompts are pre-recorded messages that are delivered with the same emotion each
time. An important next step will be to endow the COACH with the ability to reason about
the affective identity of the PwD, and about the affective content of the prompts and responses.
Here we show how BayesAct can be used to provide this level of affective reasoning. Importantly,
BayesAct can learn the affective identity of the client (PwD) during the interaction. Studies of
identity in Alzheimer’s disease have found that identity changes dramatically over the course of
the disease [38], and that PwD have more vague or abstract notions of their self-identity [56].
In this section, we describe our handwashing assistant model, and then show in simulation how
BayesAct may be able to provide tailored prompting that fits each individual better.
We use a model of the handwashing system with 8 plansteps corresponding to the different steps
of handwashing, desribing the state of the water (on/off), and hands (dirty/soapy/clean and
wet/dry). An eight-valued variable PS describes the current planstep. There are probabilistic
transitions between plansteps described in a probabilistic plan-graph (e.g. a PwD sometimes
uses soap first, but sometimes turns on the tap first). We also use a binary variable AW
describing if the PwD is aware or not. In [37], we also had a variable describing how responsive
a person is to a prompt. Here, we replace that with the current deflection in the interaction.
Thus, X = {PS,AW} and the dynamics of the PS are
• If the PwD is aware, then if there was no prompt from the agent, she will advance stochas-
tically to the next planstep (according to the plan-graph) with a probability that is de-
pendent on the current deflection, D. That is Pr(PS′|PS = s,AW = yes,D = d) = f(d)
where f is a function specified manually. If she does not advance, she loses awareness.
• If the PwD is aware and is prompted and deflection is high, then a prompt will likely
confuse the PwD (cause her awareness to become “no” if it was “yes”). Again, this
happens stochastically according to a manually specified distribution fp(d).
• If the PwD is not aware, they will not do anything (or do something else) with high
probability, unless a prompt was given and the deflection is low, in which case she will
follow the prompt and will gain awareness.
We have done preliminary simulations with this model by using an agent identity of “assistant”
(EPA = [1.5, 0.51, 0.45]), and an initial client identity of “patient” (EPA = [0.90,−0.69,−1.05]).
The client knows the identity of the agent, but the agent must learn the identity of the client.
Agent and client both know their own identities. We compare two types of policies: one where
the affective actions are computed with BayesAct, and the other where the affective actions are
fixed. In both cases, we used a simple heuristic for the propositional actions where the client is
prompted if the agent’s belief about the client’s awareness (AW ) falls below 0.4.
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We have found that a fixed affective policy may work well for some affective identities, but not
for others, whereas the actions suggested by BayesAct work well across the different identities
that the client may have. For example, if the client really does have the affective identity of
a “patient”, then always issuing the prompts with an EPA = [0.15, 0.32, 0.06] (the affective
rating of the behavior “prompt” in the ACT database) and otherwise simply “minding” the
client (EPA = [0.86, 0.17,−0.16]) leads to the client completing the task in an equal number of
steps as BayesAct, and always completing the task within 50 steps. However, if the client has
an affective identity that is more “good” (EPA = [1.67, 0.01,−1.03], corresponding to “elder”)
or more powerful (EPA = [0.48, 2.16, 0.94], corresponding to “boss”), then this particular fixed
policy does significantly worse. Example simulations and more complete results are shown in
Appendix E.
The full development of the BayesAct emotional add-on to the existing COACH system will
require substantial future work and empirical testing, as will fully developing an affectively
intelligent tutoring system like the one described in the previous section. However, in light
of the preliminary results reported here, we are convinced that BayesAct provides a useful
theoretical foundation for such endeavours.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper has presented a probabilistic and decision theoretic formulation of affect control
theory called BayesAct, and has shown its use for human interactive systems. The paper’s main
contributions are the theoretical model development, and a demonstration that a computational
agent can use BayesAct to integrate reasoning about emotions with application decisions in a
parsimonious and well-grounded way.
Overall, our model uses the underlying principle of deflection minimisation from affect control
theory to provide a general-purpose affective monitoring, analysis and intervention theory. The
key contributions of this paper are
1. A formulation of affect control theory as a probabilistic and decision theoretic model that
generalises the original presentation in the social psychological literature in the following
ways:
(a) it makes exact predictions of emotions using the equations of affect control theory,
generalising the partial updates of ACT,
(b) it removes the assumption that identities are fixed through time and allows an agent
to model a changing identity,
(c) it removes the assumption that sentiments (of identities and behaviours) are known
exactly by modelling them as probability distributions.
2. A set of simulations that demonstrate some of the capabilities of this generalised model of
ACT under varying environmental noise.
3. A formulation of a general-purpose model for intelligent interaction that augments the
model proposed by BayesAct in the following ways:
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(a) It adds a propositional state vector that models other events occurring as a result of
the interaction, and models this state vector’s progression as being dependent on the
affective deflection of the interaction
(b) It adds a reward function that an agent can optimise directly, allowing an agent to
combine deflection minimisation with goal pursual in a parsimonious and theoretically
well-grounded way.
4. Demonstrative examples of building two simple intelligent interative systems (a tutor and
an assistive agent for person’s with a cognitive disability) that use the proposed model to
better align itself with a user.
Our current work is investigating methods for learning affective dictionaries automatically from
text, and on implementing hierarchical models of identity as proposed in [34]. In future, the
measurement of EPA behaviours and the translation of EPA actions requires further study. We
also plan to investigate usages of the model for collaborative agents in more complex domains,
for competitive, manipulative or therapeutic agents, conversational agents, social networks, and
for social simulations where we have more than two agents acting. Emotions have been shown to
be important for decision making in general, and we believe that BayesAct can play a significant
role in this regard [31]. We also plan to investigate methods for automatically learning the
parameters of the prediction equations, and the identity labels. This would allow longer-term
learning and adaptation for agents. Finally, we plan to investigate how to handle more complex
time structures in BayesAct, including interruptions.
A BayesAct agent uses the affect control principle to make predictions about the behaviours of
the agents it interacts with. This principle states that humans will act to minimise the deflection
between their culturally shared fundamental (learned and slowly changing) affective sentiments
and the transient sentiments created by specific events and situations. In situations where both
agents follow this principle, and know each other’s affective identities, the agents do not have
to compute long-term predictions: they can simply assume the predictions of the affect control
principle are correct and act accordingly. A breakdown occurs if these predictions no longer
hold.
There are three types of breakdown. The first is simple environmental noise. However, we
have seen that, alone, this does not have a significant effect. Agents essentially “ignore” other
agents in the presence of environmental noise, if they can assume the other agents are following
the principle. In combination with the other two breakdown types, it can have a much more
significant effect. The second type of breakdown can occur if one agent does not know the identity
of the other agent. We have investigated this situation in detail in this paper in simulation, and
found that BayesAct agents can learn the affective identities of other BayesAct agents under
significant environmental noise. Finally, the third type of breakdown is when one agent is
deliberately trying to manipulate the other. In such cases, both agents must do more complex
policy computation, as the predictive power of the affect control principle no longer holds.
Computing these policies for such manipulative agents is a significant area for future work.
In this regard, it is interesting to note that the default (normative) policy specified by Equa-
tion (32) corresponds roughly with what behavioral economists have called fast or “System 1”
thinking [29]. The Monte-Carlo method for forward search can be set up to explore only actions
that are nearby to this default action for each state, providing the agent with a quick-and-dirty
method for quickly finding reasonable policies that will be socially acceptable or normative. In a
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resource limited agent, this type of fast thinking may be just enough to “get by”. Given enough
time or sufficient cognitive resources, and agent may then resort to slow (“System 2”) thinking,
and explore (in simulation) actions that are further away from the default. This slow thinking
can lead an agent to discover slightly non-normative actions that lead to higher self reward,
without giving away the fact (so remaining close enough to the normative default). The opens
the door for building effective manipulative agents.
These considerations of breakdown lead to a tantalizing avenue for future research. One way
to handle breakdowns would be to increase the size of the (non-affective) state vector (denoted
X in this paper). Additional values of X would be needed in order to better predict when the
breakdowns occur and what the effects are. For example, an agent could learn what situations
caused another agent to change identities, or could learn what types of identities are present in
certain situations (called “settings” in ACT [21]). Such an increase of X is a creation of new
“meaning” in an agent. These new meanings would need to be validated with other agents, a
process of negotiation attempting to get back to the easy state of “flow” where less reasoning
is required [11]. A learning paradigm that is fundamentally based on affective reasoning would
therefore arise. Such a paradigm has been discussed as fundamental in the literature [83].
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A Derivation of Most Likely Behaviour
We know from Equation (10) and (12) that the belief distribution over the state at time t
(denoted s′) is given by
b(s′) = Pr(ω′|s′)Eb(s)
[
Pr(x′|x, f ′, τ ′,ba)Pr(τ ′|τ , f ′,x)Pr(f ′|f , τ ,x,ba)
]
(38)
and further, from Equation (22) that
Pr(f ′|f , τ ,x,ba, ϕ) ∝ e−ψ(f ′,τ ,x)
[
EPr(θf )(θf )
]
(39)
Let us first assume that the prior over θf is uninformative, and so only the first expectation
remains. Then, if we compare two values for s′, say s′1 and s′2, and we imagine that we have
deterministic dynamics for the application state X and the transients T, then we find
b(s′1)− b(s′2) ∝ Eb(s)
(
e−ψ(f
′
1,s1) − e−ψ(f ′2,s2)
)
(40)
≥ e−ψ(f ′1,Eb(s)(s1)) − e−ψ(f ′2,Eb(s)(s2)) (41)
where the inequality between (40) and (41) is due to the expectation of a convex function being
always larger than the function of the expectation (Jensen’s inequality). From (41), we have
that the probability of f ′1 will be greater than the probability of f ′2 if and only if:
ψ(f ′1,Eb(s)(s1)) < ψ(f ′2,Eb(s)(s2)) (42)
that is, the deflection caused by f ′1 is less than the deflection caused by f ′2. This demonstrates
that our probability measure over f ′ will assign higher likelihoods to behaviours with lower
deflection, as expected, and so if we wish find the most likely f ′ value, we have only to find the
value that gives the smallest deflection by, e.g., taking derivatives and setting equal to zero. The
probabilistic formulation in Equation (42), however, takes this one step further, and shows that
the probability of f ′ will assign higher weights to behaviours that minimize deflection, but in
expectation of the state progression if it is not fully deterministic.
If the prior over θf is such that we expect identities to stay constant over time, as in Equa-
tion (25), we can derive a similar expression to (42), except it now includes the deflections of
the fundamentals over identities:
ψ(f ′1,Eb(s)(s1)) + ξ(f ′1, f) < ψ(f ′2,Eb(s)(s2)) + ξ(f ′2, f) (43)
We see that this is now significantly different than (42), as the relative weights of ξ (βa and
βc) and ψ (α) will play a large role in determining which fundamental sentiments are most
likely. If βa  α or βc  α, then the agents beliefs about identities will change more readily
to accommodate observed deflections. If the opposite is true, then deflections will be ignored to
accommodate constant identities.
B Reduction to ACT behaviours
In this section, we show that the most likely predictions from our model match those from [21]
if we use the same approximations. We begin from the probability distribution of fundamentals
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from Equation (25), but we assume deterministic state transitions, ignore the fundamental
inertia ξ, and use the formula for ψ as given by Equation (28), we get
Pr(f ′|f , τ ,x,ba, ϕ) ∝ e−(f ′−K −1C )TK TΣ−1K (f ′−K −1C ) (44)
Now we saw in Section 3.3 that this was simply a Gaussian with a mean of K −1C , and so
gives us the expected (most likely or “optimal” the terms of [21]) behaviours and identities
simultaneously. We can find these expected fundamentals by taking the total derivative and
setting to zero
d
df ′
Pr(f ′|f , τ ,x,ba, ϕ) =
(
d
df ′
(f ′ −K −1C )TK TΣ−1K (f ′ −K −1C )
)
e−(f
′−K −1C )TK TΣ−1K (f ′−K −1C ) = 0
which means that f ′ = K −1C (the mean of the Gaussian), as expected. ACT, however, esti-
mates the derivatives of each of the identities and behaviours separately assuming the others are
held fixed. This is the same as taking partial derivatives of (44) with respect to fb only while
holding the others fixed:(
∂
∂f ′b
(f ′ −K −1C )TK TΣ−1K (f ′ −K −1C )
)
e−(f
′−K −1C )TK TΣ−1K (f ′−K −1C ) = 0 (45)
Now, we recall that (writing I ≡ I3 and 0 ≡ 03):
K =
 I −Ha 00 1−Hb 0
0 −Hc I

So that
K −1 =
 I Ha(1−Hb)−1 00 (1−Hb)−1 0
0 Hc(1−Hb)−1 I

and if Σ is a diagonal identity matrix, we can write
K TΣ−1K =
 I −Ha 0−Ha H 2a + (1−Hb)2 +H 2c −Hc
0 −Hc I

To simplify, we let a = −Ha, b = 1−Hb, c = −Hc, and z =H 2a + (1−Hb)2 +H 2c we get
K TΣ−1K =
 I a 0a z c
0 c I

we also have that
f −K −1C =
 fa − (Ca +Ha(1−Hb)−1Cb)fb − (1−Hb)−1Cb
fc −
(
Cc +Hc(1−Hb)−1Cb
)
 =
 yayb
yc

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where we have used ya, yb, yc to denote the difference between the actor identity, behaviour and
object identity and their respective true means as given by the total derivative. Therefore, we
have from Equation (45):
∂
∂fb
(
y2a + 2ayayb + zy
2
b + 2cybyc + y
2
c
)
= 0
2aya + 2zyb + 2cyc = 0
and therefore that the “optimal” behaviour, f∗b is
f∗b = −z−1(aya + cyc) + (1−Hb)−1Cb
partially expanding out this is
f∗b = −z−1
[−Ha(fa − Ca − CbHa(1−Hb)−1)−Hc(fc − Cc − CbHc(1−Hb)−1)− zCb(1−Hb)−1]
(46)
Now we note that, the terms from [21] can be written as follows
[
I −M ′] Iβgβ =
 fa − Ca−Cb
fc − Cc

and [
I −M ′] IβSβ =
 HaI −Hb
Hc

so that
STβIβ
[
I
−M ′
] [
I −M ′] Iβgβ = −Ha(fa − Ca)− Cb(I −Hb)−Hc(fc − Cc) (47)
and that(
STβIβ
[
I
−M ′
] [
I −M ′] IβSβ)−1 = (H Ta Ha + (I −Hb)T (I −Hb) +H Tc Hc)−1 = z−1
so that f∗b is now
f∗b = −
(
STβIβ
[
I
−M ′
] [
I −M ′] IβSβ)−1×[−Ha(fa − Ca) +HaCbHa(1−Hb)−1 −Hc(fc − Cc) +HcHbHc(1−Hb)−1
− (H Ta Ha + (1−Hb)T (1−Hb) +H Tc Hc)Cb(1−Hb)−1] (48)
collecting terms and comparing to Equation (47), this give us exactly Equation (12.21) from [21]:
f∗b = −
(
STβIβ
[
I
−M ′
] [
I −M ′] IβSβ)−1 STβIβ [ I−M ′
] [
I −M ′] Iβgβ (49)
Similar equations for actor and object identities can be obtained in the same way by computing
with partial derivatives keeping all other quantities fixed, and the result is equations (13.11) and
(13.18) from [21].
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C Tabulated Simulation Results
Table 3 shows examples of behaviours for different levels of deflection. Each row shows the
two behaviour labels and their actual id-deflection. The first column shows the maximum id-
deflection searched for.
We explore three conditions in our simulations. In the first two, the agent does not know the
identity of the client, and the client either knows or doesn’t know the identity of the agent
(denoted agent id known and agent id hidden, resp.). In the third case, agent and client know
each other’s identities (denoted both known). We run 20 trials, and in each trial a new identity
is chosen for each of agent and client. These two identities are independently sampled from the
distribution of identities in the ACT database and are the personal identities for each agent
and client. Then, agent and client BayesAct models are initialised with Fa set to this personal
identity, Fc (identity of the other) set to either the true identity (if known) or else to the mean
of the identities in the database, [0.4, 0.4, 0.5]. Fb is set to zeros, but this is not important as it
plays no role in the first update. Table 4 shows the mean (over 20 trials) of the average (over
10 experiments) final (at the last step) id-deflection for agent and client for varying numbers
of samples and environment noises. Table 4 also shows the total deflection (Equation (1)) and
the maximum deflection across all experiments and time steps, for each agent. Note that the
deflections are independent of the environment noise for the case where both identities are
known. This is because, in this case, the actions of both agents follows exactly the dynamics
as given by ACT, even with a small number of samples. When the environment noise rises, the
agents both effectively ignore the observations, and more of the probability mass comes from
the dynamics of the affect control principle and the identity inertia.
The simulation proceeds according to the procedure in Section 3.5 for 50 steps. Agents take
turns acting, and actions are conveyed to the other agent with the addition of some zero-mean
normally distributed “environment” noise, with standard deviation σe. Agents use Gaussian
observation models with uniform covariances with diagonal variances γ = max(0.5, σe). We
perform 10 simulations per trial with βc = 0.001 for both agent and client. If the client knows
the agent identity, it uses no roughening noise (σr = 0.0), otherwise all agents use σr = N
−1/3
where N is the number of samples. We use id-deflection to denote the sum of squared differences
between one agent’s estimate of the other agent’s identity, and that other agent’s estimate of its
own identity.
There are fewer effects to be analysed in the both known case as each agent knows exactly the
identity of the other agent, and both agents follow the affect control principle and the dynamics
of affect control theory. Therefore, they hardly need observations of the other agent, as these
only serve to confirm accurate predictions. This is exactly what the affect control principle
predicts: agents that share cultural affective sentiments and follow the affect control principle
don’t need to make any effort, as they maintain a harmonious balance. The agent id known case
shows some of the same effects as the agent id hidden case, but for only one of the agents.
Table 5 shows the results for the experiments with client shifting its identity after 10 steps and
then staying at the new identity until 100 steps. We see that BayesAct is able to successfully
recover: the id-deflection and deflection are both the same at the end of the 100 steps, regardless
of sid.
Table 6 shows the mean number of time steps per sequence of 200 steps in which the id-deflection
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of the agent’s estimate of the client’s identity is greater than a threshold, dm. The results
are shown for a variety of environment noises, σe, and iddentity shifting speeds, sid. The
results show that BayesAct is able to maintain a low id-deflection throughout the sequence
when confronted with speeds up to about 0.5 and environment noises less than σe = 0.5. At
this setting (sid = σe = 0.5), only 12 frames (out of 200) have an id-deflection greater than 1.0.
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σr id1 id2 |id1 − id2|
≤ 0.02 - - -
0.05 quarrel with quibble with 0.046
0.05 hoot at strip 0.033
0.05 criticize hush 0.028
0.1 make business proposal to back 0.099
0.1 whip bite 0.099
0.1 cajole seduce 0.095
0.1 work overwhelm 0.095
0.1 bash distract 0.093
0.2 command tackle 0.20
0.2 make eyes at confess to 0.20
0.2 look at draw near to 0.20
0.2 sue spank 0.20
0.2 ask out approach 0.20
0.5 eat with suggest something to 0.50
0.5 shout at knock out 0.50
0.5 medicate caress 0.50
0.5 bully hassle 0.50
0.5 restrain contradict 0.50
1.0 borrow money from peek at 1.0
1.0 join up with show something to 1.0
1.0 criticize rib 1.0
1.0 sue fine 1.0
1.0 nuzzle convict 1.0
2.0 massage thank 2.0
2.0 dress console 2.0
2.0 mind accommodate 2.0
2.0 apprehend confide in 2.0
2.0 harass knock out 2.0
5.0 denounce care for 5.0
5.0 collaborate with kill 5.0
5.0 hug scoff at 5.0
5.0 listen to abandon 5.0
5.0 educate pester 5.0
≥ 10.0 steal from make love to 7.7
≥ 10.0 steal from sexually arouse 7.6
≥ 10.0 steal from help 7.5
≥ 10.0 steal from save 7.4
≥ 10.0 steal from give medical treatment to 7.4
Table 3: Most different behaviour pairs with a Euclidean distance less than σr, the environment
noise. A − indicates that there are no behaviours that are closer than the value of σr indicated.
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both known agent id known agent id hidden
deflection max. deflection id-deflection deflection max deflection id-deflection deflection max deflection
σe N agent client agent client agent agent client agent client agent client agent client agent client
0.0 5 3.2± 2.9 3.2± 2.9 13.94 14.00 0.89± 0.42 4.2± 2.1 4± 2.5 20.61 10.95 0.88± 0.46 1.1± 0.44 3.8± 2.5 4.2± 2.3 25.61 22.69
0.0 10 3.1± 3.1 3± 3.1 11.48 11.52 0.26± 0.14 4.3± 3 4± 3.1 25.68 15.46 0.43± 0.39 0.56± 0.71 3.6± 2.6 3.8± 2.3 29.21 23.49
0.0 50 3.3± 2.5 3.3± 2.5 13.90 13.93 0.2± 0.68 3.6± 3.2 3.5± 3.2 25.96 13.99 0.22± 0.42 0.34± 0.76 3.7± 2.2 3.9± 2.2 16.00 22.29
0.0 100 5.1± 6.6 5.1± 6.6 33.23 33.22 0.11± 0.26 4.2± 3.5 4± 3.5 23.47 15.18 0.12± 0.16 0.093± 0.13 2.9± 1.7 3± 1.9 13.35 12.41
0.0 250 4.5± 4.3 4.5± 4.3 21.28 21.29 0.12± 0.49 4.2± 3.7 4± 3.7 19.42 16.34 0.14± 0.3 0.04± 0.064 3.7± 3.3 3.7± 3.3 23.65 19.46
0.0 500 3.6± 2.6 3.6± 2.6 12.04 12.08 0.065± 0.19 3.7± 2.8 3.6± 2.9 14.57 14.53 0.093± 0.23 0.057± 0.14 3.6± 3.2 3.8± 3.3 15.73 23.72
0.0 1000 4.3± 3.1 4.3± 3.1 12.39 12.39 0.046± 0.12 4.5± 2.7 4.4± 2.7 12.06 10.46 0.038± 0.12 0.025± 0.053 3.7± 3.4 3.6± 3.3 17.30 21.07
0.01 5 4.2± 3.1 4.2± 3.1 12.33 12.43 0.74± 0.16 3.2± 1.9 2.6± 1.7 30.35 6.62 1.1± 0.7 1.1± 0.35 3.9± 2.3 4.5± 2.8 28.45 31.59
0.01 10 4± 3.7 4± 3.7 15.73 15.78 0.33± 0.2 4± 2.7 3.6± 2.7 19.69 11.22 0.55± 1 0.59± 0.64 5.6± 4.1 6.1± 4 32.63 41.23
0.01 50 5± 4.8 5± 4.8 25.08 25.05 0.12± 0.26 3.8± 2 3.5± 2 23.23 8.32 0.2± 0.36 0.19± 0.53 3.4± 1.8 3.6± 1.8 14.93 21.74
0.01 100 4± 3.6 4± 3.6 14.69 14.62 0.11± 0.19 4.4± 3.2 4.2± 3.3 26.03 14.73 0.086± 0.14 0.16± 0.32 3± 1.4 3± 1.4 12.22 16.81
0.01 250 3.4± 2.5 3.3± 2.5 13.60 13.64 0.14± 0.31 4.3± 3.1 4.1± 3.3 16.38 12.12 0.051± 0.096 0.034± 0.057 2.9± 1.7 3.1± 1.8 11.98 10.92
0.01 500 4.2± 3.5 4.2± 3.5 16.45 16.38 0.066± 0.19 3.8± 1.8 3.6± 1.9 19.98 10.32 0.21± 0.65 0.071± 0.15 4.7± 2.6 5.1± 3.3 15.46 23.16
0.01 1000 4.3± 3 4.3± 3 11.43 11.46 0.025± 0.067 3.5± 2.9 3.4± 3 12.49 10.57 0.083± 0.28 0.044± 0.11 3.6± 2.3 3.8± 2.3 9.91 11.61
0.05 5 4.2± 3.1 4.2± 3.1 12.33 12.39 0.89± 0.46 3.1± 1.7 2.6± 1.7 30.32 6.59 1.3± 1.1 1.3± 0.73 4.2± 2.6 4.6± 2.7 28.52 31.41
0.05 10 4± 3.7 4± 3.7 15.73 15.80 0.33± 0.19 4± 2.7 3.6± 2.7 16.73 11.19 0.53± 0.83 0.48± 0.43 5.8± 4.2 5.9± 3.7 32.58 41.23
0.05 50 5± 4.8 5± 4.8 25.08 25.06 0.098± 0.16 3.7± 2 3.5± 2 17.56 8.33 0.17± 0.36 0.22± 0.63 3.5± 1.8 3.7± 1.8 19.98 22.34
0.05 100 4± 3.6 4± 3.6 14.70 14.64 0.11± 0.2 4.4± 3.3 4.2± 3.3 26.05 14.72 0.12± 0.2 0.18± 0.38 2.9± 1.4 3.1± 1.5 14.30 17.15
0.05 250 3.4± 2.5 3.3± 2.5 13.60 13.65 0.17± 0.37 4.3± 3 4.1± 3.3 17.55 12.13 0.051± 0.086 0.043± 0.089 2.9± 1.7 3.1± 1.8 10.12 11.05
0.05 500 4.2± 3.5 4.2± 3.5 16.42 16.38 0.074± 0.2 3.8± 1.9 3.6± 1.9 19.35 10.32 0.18± 0.54 0.069± 0.15 4.7± 2.5 5.1± 3.3 14.80 23.19
0.05 1000 4.3± 3 4.3± 3 11.43 11.47 0.042± 0.12 3.5± 2.9 3.4± 3 12.72 10.57 0.079± 0.26 0.051± 0.14 3.6± 2.3 3.8± 2.3 10.20 11.80
0.1 5 4.2± 3.1 4.2± 3.1 12.30 12.40 0.76± 0.24 3.1± 1.6 2.6± 1.7 28.81 6.59 1.2± 0.88 1.3± 0.62 4± 2.4 4.7± 2.7 31.10 35.94
0.1 10 4± 3.7 4± 3.7 15.73 15.92 0.38± 0.34 4.1± 2.7 3.6± 2.7 18.46 11.20 0.48± 0.75 0.57± 0.56 5.5± 3.9 6.2± 4.1 32.52 41.23
0.1 50 5± 4.8 5± 4.8 25.09 25.08 0.068± 0.083 3.8± 2 3.5± 2 18.07 8.34 0.2± 0.37 0.15± 0.26 3.5± 1.9 3.6± 1.9 19.76 22.47
0.1 100 4± 3.6 4± 3.6 14.69 14.65 0.11± 0.15 4.4± 3.4 4.2± 3.3 26.06 14.72 0.11± 0.17 0.17± 0.33 2.9± 1.4 3.1± 1.6 15.68 16.99
0.1 250 3.4± 2.5 3.3± 2.5 13.59 13.64 0.22± 0.49 4.4± 3.1 4.1± 3.3 18.14 12.13 0.053± 0.076 0.043± 0.077 2.9± 1.7 3.1± 1.8 11.87 12.05
0.1 500 4.2± 3.5 4.2± 3.5 16.40 16.41 0.064± 0.16 3.7± 1.8 3.6± 1.9 19.74 10.35 0.2± 0.64 0.079± 0.17 4.8± 2.6 5.1± 3.3 14.96 23.23
0.1 1000 4.3± 3 4.3± 3 11.44 11.47 0.044± 0.14 3.5± 2.9 3.4± 3 12.71 10.59 0.08± 0.25 0.035± 0.071 3.6± 2.3 3.8± 2.3 14.58 12.06
0.5 5 4.2± 3.1 4.2± 3.1 12.33 12.44 1.2± 0.46 3.3± 1.8 2.6± 1.7 21.88 6.62 1.5± 0.54 1.7± 0.5 3.5± 1.9 4.1± 1.8 23.42 26.62
0.5 10 4± 3.7 4± 3.7 15.88 15.95 0.78± 0.26 4.3± 2.9 3.6± 2.7 19.11 11.26 1± 0.7 0.96± 0.59 5.1± 3.6 5.2± 3.6 31.49 28.43
0.5 50 5± 4.8 5± 4.8 25.10 25.20 0.27± 0.092 3.7± 2 3.5± 2 23.06 8.36 0.42± 0.37 0.36± 0.38 3.5± 1.8 3.7± 1.8 22.53 16.93
0.5 100 4± 3.6 4± 3.6 14.75 14.84 0.26± 0.18 4.4± 3.4 4.2± 3.3 25.07 14.76 0.28± 0.15 0.35± 0.35 3± 1.4 3.1± 1.6 16.18 20.26
0.5 250 3.4± 2.5 3.3± 2.5 13.71 13.65 0.26± 0.25 4.3± 3.1 4.1± 3.3 18.51 12.23 0.23± 0.24 0.2± 0.17 3± 1.7 3.2± 1.9 11.88 17.96
0.5 500 4.2± 3.5 4.2± 3.5 16.47 16.52 0.15± 0.13 3.7± 1.8 3.6± 1.9 19.16 10.43 0.29± 0.51 0.21± 0.21 4.8± 2.4 5.1± 3.3 19.23 22.26
0.5 1000 4.3± 3 4.3± 3 11.52 11.52 0.11± 0.083 3.5± 2.9 3.4± 3 21.50 10.61 0.14± 0.15 0.13± 0.063 3.7± 2.3 3.8± 2.4 15.24 14.32
1.0 5 4.2± 3.1 4.2± 3.1 12.32 12.41 3.8± 1.8 4.6± 1.7 3± 2 32.28 9.61 4.2± 2.3 3.8± 1.3 5.3± 2.2 6.6± 2.7 37.97 36.38
1.0 10 4± 3.7 4± 3.7 15.88 15.87 2± 1.2 4.8± 3 3.6± 2.7 21.89 11.28 2.4± 1.1 2.2± 0.98 6± 3.7 6.3± 2.9 31.65 44.60
1.0 50 5± 4.8 5± 4.8 25.06 25.11 0.82± 0.48 3.9± 2 3.5± 2 18.08 8.36 1± 0.57 0.88± 0.57 3.9± 1.7 4.2± 1.8 25.62 28.23
1.0 100 4± 3.6 4± 3.6 14.70 14.71 0.83± 0.6 4.5± 3.4 4.2± 3.3 27.90 14.75 0.76± 0.39 0.92± 0.72 3.2± 1.3 3.4± 1.8 18.80 19.19
1.0 250 3.4± 2.5 3.3± 2.5 13.66 13.63 0.61± 0.59 4.4± 3 4.1± 3.3 19.39 12.15 0.63± 0.49 0.5± 0.21 3± 1.4 3.5± 2.1 12.91 24.54
1.0 500 4.2± 3.5 4.2± 3.5 16.45 16.43 0.49± 0.33 3.9± 1.7 3.6± 1.9 20.58 10.38 0.57± 0.48 0.57± 0.31 5.1± 2.7 5.4± 3.2 20.62 26.60
1.0 1000 4.3± 3 4.3± 3 11.48 11.49 0.42± 0.52 3.5± 2.7 3.4± 3 21.57 10.60 0.4± 0.21 0.44± 0.22 3.7± 2.2 4.1± 2.5 18.67 16.60
2.0 5 4.2± 3.1 4.2± 3.1 12.32 12.41 7.6± 3.2 6.5± 3 3± 2 57.94 9.56 9.5± 3.8 8.8± 2.5 7.1± 2.2 8± 3 36.84 42.81
2.0 10 4± 3.7 4± 3.7 15.78 15.89 5.4± 3.1 5.6± 3.3 3.6± 2.7 53.66 11.27 5.9± 2.7 5.7± 1.9 6.7± 3.8 7.7± 2.9 39.83 48.78
2.0 50 5± 4.8 5± 4.8 25.05 25.11 2.3± 1.4 4.1± 1.9 3.5± 2 25.90 8.34 2.4± 0.93 2.1± 0.91 4.6± 1.9 5.1± 2.3 32.77 30.85
2.0 100 4± 3.6 4± 3.6 14.66 14.62 2.2± 1.1 5.2± 3.4 4.2± 3.3 33.76 14.74 2± 0.64 2.1± 0.92 3.8± 1.4 4± 1.6 20.82 20.96
2.0 250 3.4± 2.5 3.3± 2.5 13.63 13.66 1.6± 0.97 4.7± 2.7 4.1± 3.3 23.76 12.14 1.6± 0.56 1.4± 0.38 3.4± 1.4 4.4± 2.5 25.07 34.36
2.0 500 4.2± 3.5 4.2± 3.5 16.42 16.41 1.4± 0.62 4.1± 1.6 3.6± 1.9 21.56 10.34 1.4± 0.93 1.7± 0.7 5.6± 2.5 5.9± 3.2 25.22 24.22
2.0 1000 4.3± 3 4.3± 3 11.44 11.48 1.1± 0.59 3.8± 2.4 3.4± 3 23.69 10.59 1.1± 0.37 1.3± 0.43 4.2± 2.4 4.7± 2.6 23.69 21.91
5.0 5 4.2± 3.1 4.2± 3.1 12.29 12.40 19± 5.2 9.3± 3 3± 2 68.72 9.52 19± 6.1 20± 4.8 8.9± 2.5 11± 3.5 51.93 77.55
5.0 10 4± 3.7 4± 3.7 15.72 15.80 14± 5 7.2± 3.1 3.6± 2.7 39.97 11.23 15± 4.5 13± 3.8 8.4± 3.7 9.7± 3.2 65.43 58.71
5.0 50 5± 4.8 5± 4.8 25.11 25.08 6.5± 2.6 5.4± 1.8 3.5± 2 28.77 8.34 6.9± 2.2 6.7± 2.5 6.3± 1.7 6.1± 1.3 41.35 32.89
5.0 100 4± 3.6 4± 3.6 14.66 14.60 5.1± 1.6 6± 2.3 4.2± 3.3 28.69 14.74 5.1± 2 5± 1.7 5± 1.5 5.5± 1.6 27.75 26.21
5.0 250 3.4± 2.5 3.3± 2.5 13.63 13.65 4± 1.2 5.9± 2.7 4.1± 3.3 29.17 12.13 4.4± 1.5 4± 0.88 4.7± 1.5 6.2± 2.6 23.32 24.38
5.0 500 4.2± 3.5 4.2± 3.5 16.43 16.39 3.8± 1.2 5.4± 1.6 3.6± 1.9 19.11 10.33 3.5± 1.4 3.5± 1.2 6.6± 2.3 7± 2.4 31.47 24.31
5.0 1000 4.3± 3 4.3± 3 11.44 11.47 3± 0.95 4.9± 2.1 3.4± 3 22.51 10.58 3.2± 1 3.2± 1.1 5.3± 2.2 6.3± 2.5 20.61 24.65
10.0 5 4.2± 3.1 4.2± 3.1 12.32 12.39 26± 5.8 11± 4.5 3± 2 67.70 9.54 27± 7.4 28± 9.3 11± 2.9 13± 4.3 58.03 64.23
10.0 10 4± 3.7 4± 3.7 15.72 15.78 19± 7 8.2± 3.6 3.6± 2.7 41.59 11.23 22± 5.4 19± 6.4 10± 4.5 11± 3.7 75.09 47.14
10.0 50 5± 4.8 5± 4.8 25.12 25.07 12± 5.2 7.7± 3.4 3.5± 2 62.12 8.34 11± 3.4 10± 3.1 7.2± 1.6 7.4± 1.9 36.90 34.22
10.0 100 4± 3.6 4± 3.6 14.66 14.60 8.1± 2.8 7± 2.3 4.2± 3.3 38.44 14.73 8.4± 2.4 7.9± 2.5 6.5± 1.8 7± 1.9 26.87 30.49
10.0 250 3.4± 2.5 3.3± 2.5 13.62 13.64 6.3± 2.2 7± 2.5 4.1± 3.3 30.96 12.13 5.8± 2.3 5.5± 1.4 5.5± 1.7 7± 2.1 18.64 21.72
10.0 500 4.2± 3.5 4.2± 3.5 16.44 16.39 5.7± 2.1 6.3± 1.4 3.6± 1.9 19.84 10.33 5.3± 2.3 5.4± 2.3 7.5± 2.4 7.3± 1.4 29.68 23.55
10.0 1000 4.3± 3 4.3± 3 11.44 11.47 4.5± 2.1 6.1± 1.8 3.4± 3 20.38 10.57 4.4± 2 4.4± 1.5 5.9± 1.9 7.5± 2.2 18.74 25.56
Table 4: Deflections of identities from simulations with different numbers of samples (N), and environment noise, σe. Roughening
noise: σr = N
−1/3, model environment noise: γ = max(0.5, σe). id-deflections in cases where the identity is known are not shown
as they are all very small (less than 10−3).
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id-deflection deflection num deflected frames
σe sid agent client agent client
(×103) dm = 1.0 dm = 2.0 dm = 3.0 dm = 5.0
0.1 0.01 0.065± 0.15 0.28± 0.14 3.1± 2.3 3± 2.4 4.12± 9.09 0.53± 0.96 0.04± 0.20 0.00± 0.00
0.1 0.1 0.16± 0.13 0.27± 0.13 3.6± 2.4 3.9± 2.7 5.14± 12.03 0.94± 5.71 0.04± 0.20 0.00± 0.00
0.1 0.5 0.51± 0.54 0.28± 0.14 3.2± 2.3 3.4± 2.4 18.11± 18.37 1.94± 4.52 0.19± 1.53 0.00± 0.00
0.1 1.0 0.51± 0.97 0.28± 0.1 3.2± 2.3 3.5± 2.5 16.80± 18.47 3.69± 7.14 0.35± 1.32 0.00± 0.00
0.1 2.0 0.14± 0.33 0.29± 0.12 3.4± 2.4 3.5± 2.5 10.36± 12.56 2.50± 4.72 0.60± 2.16 0.04± 0.49
0.5 0.01 0.17± 0.06 0.31± 0.14 3.1± 2.3 3± 2.4 6.20± 6.59 0.84± 1.52 0.06± 0.29 0.00± 0.00
0.5 0.1 0.31± 0.16 0.3± 0.13 3.6± 2.4 3.9± 2.7 9.89± 13.75 1.28± 5.69 0.10± 0.57 0.00± 0.00
0.5 0.5 0.69± 0.48 0.31± 0.11 3.2± 2.2 3.5± 2.5 23.99± 20.29 2.83± 5.40 0.18± 1.03 0.00± 0.00
0.5 1.0 0.71± 1.1 0.3± 0.14 3.2± 2.2 3.5± 2.5 21.87± 19.54 4.96± 9.27 0.74± 2.68 0.00± 0.00
0.5 2.0 0.3± 0.32 0.29± 0.15 3.3± 2.3 3.5± 2.5 15.20± 15.48 3.21± 6.31 0.72± 2.52 0.03± 0.35
1.0 0.01 0.41± 0.24 0.28± 0.13 3± 2 3± 2.4 20.70± 19.44 3.23± 7.13 0.27± 1.14 0.00± 0.00
1.0 0.1 0.94± 0.99 0.31± 0.16 3.3± 2.1 3.9± 2.7 35.76± 23.98 4.32± 10.78 0.69± 4.56 0.00± 0.00
1.0 0.5 1.1± 0.74 0.28± 0.12 3.1± 2.1 3.5± 2.5 41.83± 23.05 8.47± 11.46 0.91± 2.92 0.00± 0.00
1.0 1.0 1.1± 1.2 0.27± 0.11 3.2± 2.2 3.5± 2.5 38.22± 24.14 9.12± 13.40 1.82± 5.33 0.01± 0.14
1.0 2.0 0.63± 0.51 0.29± 0.13 3.3± 2.3 3.5± 2.5 31.57± 20.70 6.37± 10.64 1.23± 4.22 0.01± 0.07
Table 5: Deflections of identities from simulations with different environment noise, σe, and shapeshifted id speed, sid. N = 250,
agent-id-hidden, dm ≡ threshold for frame deflection.
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id-deflection deflection num deflected frames
σe sid agent client agent client
(×103) dm = 1.0 dm = 2.0 dm = 3.0 dm = 5.0
0.1 0.01 0.048± 0.051 0.88± 0.45 2.9± 1.7 2.9± 1.8 3.60± 5.42 0.64± 0.89 0.09± 0.28 0.00± 0.00
0.1 0.1 0.16± 0.094 0.82± 0.34 2.9± 1.6 2.9± 1.6 4.31± 6.82 0.63± 0.86 0.09± 0.28 0.00± 0.00
0.1 0.5 0.74± 0.8 0.83± 0.39 3.1± 1.4 3.3± 1.7 44.06± 44.05 5.61± 14.75 0.56± 2.70 0.00± 0.00
0.1 1.0 0.75± 1 0.85± 0.4 3.1± 1.5 3.4± 1.6 40.98± 46.90 9.68± 23.76 2.40± 9.69 0.03± 0.21
0.1 2.0 0.37± 0.94 0.76± 0.51 2.8± 1.9 2.9± 2.1 22.91± 36.32 5.87± 15.39 1.66± 5.69 0.06± 0.40
0.5 0.01 0.19± 0.07 0.94± 0.37 2.9± 1.7 2.9± 1.8 7.80± 8.56 1.31± 2.94 0.26± 1.26 0.00± 0.00
0.5 0.1 0.32± 0.14 0.86± 0.35 3± 1.6 2.9± 1.6 12.84± 12.71 1.39± 3.55 0.26± 1.27 0.00± 0.00
0.5 0.5 0.88± 0.89 0.84± 0.4 3± 1.5 3.3± 1.7 54.06± 44.18 8.07± 17.32 1.11± 4.29 0.01± 0.07
0.5 1.0 0.94± 1 1± 0.46 3± 1.6 3.4± 1.7 49.47± 48.18 11.62± 24.86 3.00± 11.31 0.08± 0.48
0.5 2.0 1.2± 1.8 1.1± 0.8 3.5± 2.4 4.1± 3.1 48.40± 59.16 18.09± 32.08 5.38± 12.87 0.32± 1.54
1.0 0.01 0.43± 0.17 0.92± 0.42 2.9± 1.7 2.9± 1.8 26.59± 23.41 2.75± 4.66 0.31± 0.98 0.00± 0.00
1.0 0.1 0.66± 0.23 0.91± 0.4 3± 1.6 2.9± 1.6 57.30± 31.38 3.92± 8.54 0.57± 3.65 0.00± 0.00
1.0 0.5 1.3± 0.99 0.92± 0.47 3± 1.4 3.3± 1.7 89.39± 46.56 16.93± 26.96 2.65± 9.29 0.10± 1.16
1.0 1.0 1.3± 1.1 0.88± 0.44 3.1± 1.5 3.5± 1.7 79.89± 50.71 17.57± 29.44 3.67± 11.98 0.08± 1.00
1.0 2.0 1± 0.99 0.86± 0.42 3.2± 1.5 3.7± 2 59.55± 45.36 13.04± 21.26 2.94± 7.96 0.10± 0.71
Table 6: Deflections of identities from simulations with different environment noise, σe, and shapeshifted id speed, sid. N = 100,
agent-id-hidden, dm ≡ threshold for frame deflection.
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D Tutoring System Survey Results
Participants in the survey were N = 37 (22 female) students (avg. age: 30.6 years). We presented
them with four blocks of statements and behaviour labels, two blocks referring to agent and client
behaviours conditional on a correct/incorrect answer of the client. In total, the survey contained
31 possible agent statements and 26 possible client statements plus an equal number of possibly
corresponding behaviour labels. Participants were supposed to match each statement to one
of the available behaviour labels. We also asked participants to rate the affective meaning of
each statement directly using the semantic differential [22]. For 14 agent statements and for
13 client statements, a clear majority of participants agreed on one specific mapping. For 13
agent statements and 5 client statements, mappings were split between two dominant options.
In these cases, we compared the direct EPA ratings of the statements with EPA ratings of the
two behaviour labels in question to settle the ambiguity. Standard deviations of the EPA scores
were generally of the same magnitude or smaller than those reported by Heise (2010) for general
concepts, indicating high agreement.
We discarded 4 agent statements and 8 client statements, because participants’ response patterns
indicated a lack of consensus and/or unsolvable ambiguities in the mappings13. We discarded a
further 3 agent and 2 client statements because they were illogical for the tutoring application.
As a result, we thus had a list of 24 agent statements and 16 client statements with corresponding
mappings to behaviour labels from the ACT database and average EPA ratings from the survey.
We implemented these behaviours as the possible actions in the BayesAct tutoring system, using
the survey EPA ratings as the inputs/output (fb and ba).
Tables 7-10 show the results of the survey designed to map specific expressions (e.g., ”Aww,
come on, that was too hard for me!”) to corresponding behaviour labels (e.g., ”whine to”).
As described above, this was necessary to ”translate” the ongoing communication between the
agent and the client into the grammatical format required for Bayesian affect control theory
(i.e., Agent-Behavior-Client). We had two versions of each matching survey. The first table
(labeled client correct) refer to the communication which occurred whenever the client solved
a task correctly, while the expressions in the second versions of all the tables (labeled client
incorrect) were used for cases in which the client did not manage to solve a task correctly.
Tables 7 shows how often the survey respondents associated the agent expressions with any of
the available options for behaviour labels. The second column displays the label we picked in
the end, based on the frequencies of choice and the consensus among respondents about the
appropriate label. The boldface number shows the maximum across each row. Table 8 displays
average direct evaluation-potency-activity (EPA) of the expressions, without involvement of a
behaviour label. As explained above, we used these ratings to cross-check the convergence of
connotative meanings of the labels and expressions, as well as to resolve some ambiguities. Also
shown are the EPA values from the ACT database corresponding to the most likely behaviour
labels in Table 7 (if not excluded). Analogously, Tables 9 and 10 display the expression-label
match and EPA ratings, respectively, for the communication options that were given to the users
of the software, i.e. these labels/expressions correspond to the client behaviours.
We discarded a few expressions initially in the survey, where responses were so distributed that
13With sufficent data, we could simply learn or fit the observation function directly from the measured affective
profiles.
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no consensus was recognizable about the meaning of these expressions. These cases are colored
light red and are labeled ”excluded” in the second columns of Tables 7 and 9. We also discarded
a few of the expressions prior to running the tutoring trials, because they were illogical given
the actual application. These are colored light grey in the tables.
Table 7: Results of matching Tutor Expressions to Behaviour labels. Note : EPAs of expressions
were used to determine the best mach in case of ambiguity
client correct Labels
Expression Best match applaud challenge ask about compliment agree thank encourage reward admonish greet chatter joke with care for
1) Well, you got that one no problem, I
think you’re ready for something harder
challenge 5 27 0 2 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
2) Is that OK? Want another one? ask about 0 5 16 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 13
3) Great going! Here’s another one encourage 13 3 0 5 0 1 14 2 0 0 1 0 0
4) Wow - amazing work. Here’s an easy
one for you
reward 7 0 2 6 0 0 7 15 1 0 0 1 0
5) Hi! Great to see you back again! greet 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 33 1 0 2
6) Wow - you even solved this one! Great
work!
applaud 19 1 0 11 1 0 4 0 0 0 1 1 1
7) I really hope you are enjoying this ex-
ercise
care for 0 0 4 0 0 1 4 1 1 1 11 1 15
8) Nice weather today, eh? chatter 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 30 0 1
9) Can we do this a little quicker now? admonish 0 14 4 0 0 0 2 0 17 1 0 1 0
10) You are really smart, keep it up compliment 4 0 0 20 0 0 12 0 1 0 1 1 0
11) I see your point agree 0 1 0 0 35 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
12) You should be the tutor not me joke with 3 0 0 13 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 20 0
13) Thank you for using our tutoring sys-
tem
thank 0 0 0 0 1 35 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
client incorrect Labels
Expression Best match console assist apologize insult sympathize blame lecture instruct admonish be sarcastic discourage cheer up hurry help advise correct disagree guide
1) OK, that was pretty hard, I hope this
one will be more approachable for you
excluded 13 2 1 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 1
2) Try thinking about the problem differ-
ently
assist 0 15 1 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 0 0 10
3) Here’s the answer to that one. Now try
this one
excluded 0 9 0 1 0 0 2 6 0 0 0 0 2 7 0 10 0 2
4) You need to think about it like this.. instruct 0 13 0 0 0 0 3 14 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 5
5) I wonder if you are just too stupid for
this
insult 0 0 0 36 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6) Come on, a little more concentration,
OK?
admonish 1 2 0 2 1 7 0 2 13 1 2 3 3 0 2 0 0 0
7) Sorry, I may have been too demanding
on you
apologize 1 0 31 1 2 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8) Seriously !! you must be Kidding be sarcastic 0 0 0 15 0 0 1 1 3 15 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
9) I don’t think you work hard enough.
Reconsider your attitude!
blame 0 0 0 5 0 20 3 0 9 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10) Don’t be sad, no one starts as a genius.
Just keep working, OK?
console 20 1 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 2 0 9 0 0 1 0 0 0
11) Can we do this a little quicker now? hurry 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 1 2 0 2 0 26 1 0 0 0 1
12) Let me show you how to do it . lecture 0 5 0 1 0 0 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 2 0 9
13) I would suggest that you think more
before answering
excluded 0 1 0 6 0 2 5 2 7 3 1 0 0 0 8 1 1 1
14) That’s not the correct answer .The
correct answer is...
correct 0 4 0 1 0 0 6 5 0 0 1 0 0 3 1 14 1 3
15) That is not what i meant disagree 0 1 4 0 1 1 1 3 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 10 10 2
16) You should work more on improving
your skills
excluded 0 0 0 2 0 2 6 3 8 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 2
17) I know how it feels to fail to answer
many questions but don’t give up
sympathize 5 0 0 0 22 0 0 1 0 0 0 10 0 1 0 0 0 0
18) I’m giving up on you, i don’t believe
you would be able to answer any question
discourage 0 0 0 16 0 1 0 0 2 2 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 8: Results of the EPA rating of Tutor Expressions.
client correct
survey results ACT database
1− 9 scale −4.3− 4.3 scale
Expression E P A E P A E P A
1) Well, you got that one no problem, I think you’re
ready for something harder
7.93 7.37 6.43 2.93 2.37 1.43 1.21 1.71 1.61
2) Is that OK? Want another one? 5.8 6 5.67 0.8 1 0.67 1.16 0.74 0.41
3) Great going! Here’s another one 8.38 7.62 6.93 3.38 2.62 1.93 2.3 1.39 0.89
4) Wow - amazing work. Here’s an easy one for you 7.9 6.63 6.6 2.9 1.63 1.6 2.72 1.92 0.84
5) Hi! Great to see you back again! 7.13 6.33 5.87 2.13 1.33 0.87 2.18 1.56 1.16
6) Wow - you even solved this one! Great work! 8.48 7.57 5.93 3.48 2.57 0.93 2.15 1.63 1.62
7) I really hope you are enjoying this exercise 6.37 5.63 4.9 1.37 0.63 -0.1 2.95 2.02 -0.28
8) Nice weather today, eh? 5.47 4.37 4.43 0.47 -0.63 -0.57 0.9 0.96 1.32
9) Can we do this a little quicker now? 4.23 5.8 6.37 -0.77 0.8 1.37 -0.6 0.63 0.6
10) You are really smart, keep it up 7.52 6.9 5.6 2.52 1.9 0.6 2.56 1.89 0.99
11) I see your point 6.28 5.9 5.31 1.28 0.9 0.31 1.66 1.27 0.87
12) You should be the tutor not me 6.86 6.93 6.18 1.86 1.93 1.18 2.0 1.56 1.81
13) Thank you for using our tutoring system 5.8 5.1 4.83 0.8 0.1 -0.17 2.93 2.01 1.49
client incorrect
survey results ACT database
1− 9 scale −4.3− 4.3 scale
Expression E P A E P A E P A
1) OK, that was pretty hard, I hope this one will be
more approachable for you
5.85 6 6.07 0.85 1 1.07
2) Try thinking about the problem differently 6.07 6.26 6.3 1.07 1.26 1.3 2.2 1.64 0.75
3) Here’s the answer to that one. Now try this one 5.11 5.3 5.81 0.11 0.3 0.81
4) You need to think about it like this.. 5.44 6.24 6.36 0.44 1.24 1.36 1.85 1.65 0.3
5) I wonder if you are just too stupid for this 1.59 6.67 5.31 -3.41 1.67 0.31 -1.88 -0.46 0.56
6) Come on, a little more concentration, OK? 3.48 6.33 5.81 -1.52 1.33 0.81 -0.6 0.63 0.6
7) Sorry, I may have been too demanding on you 5.3 5.85 5.48 0.3 0.85 0.48 1.84 1.17 -0.4
8) Seriously !! you must be Kidding 1.85 6.48 5.27 -3.15 1.48 0.27 -0.42 0.32 1.11
9) I don’t think you work hard enough. Reconsider
your attitude!
2.22 6.15 6 -2.78 1.15 1 -1.55 -0.16 0.2
10) Don’t be sad, none starts as a genius. Just keep
working, OK?
6.11 6.52 6.15 1.11 1.52 1.15 2.14 1.54 0.32
11) Can we do this a little quicker now? 4.26 5.78 6.07 -0.74 0.78 1.07 -0.58 0.4 1.61
12) Let me show you how to do it . 4.63 5.89 6.26 -0.37 0.89 1.26 -0.28 0.31 0.35
13) I would suggest that you think more before an-
swering
3.48 5.74 5.27 -1.52 0.74 0.27
14) That’s not the correct answer .The correct answer
is...
4.31 5.17 5.36 -0.69 0.17 0.36 0.7 1.02 0.28
15) That is not what i meant 4.46 5.15 4.96 -0.54 0.15 -0.04 0.06 0.75 0.63
16) You should work more on improving your skills 4.15 5.78 5.26 -0.85 0.78 0.26
17) I know how it feels to fail to answer many questions
but don’t give up
6.11 6.63 6.11 1.11 1.63 1.11 2.12 1.59 -0.1
18) I’m giving up on you, i don’t believe you would be
able to answer any question
1.48 6.41 5.22 -3.52 1.41 0.22 -1.69 -0.44 -0.56
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Table 9: Results of matching Client Expressions to Behaviour labels. Note : EPAs of expressions
were used to determine the best mach in case of ambiguity
client correct Labels
Expression Best match whine to brag to ask praise contradict chat with answer be sarcastic beam at thank challenge agree surprised by
1) awwww come on that was toooo hard . whine to 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 1 0 0
2) bah - give me something harder brag to 0 17 1 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 11 0 0
3) Here is your answer! answer 0 2 0 1 0 0 23 1 4 0 3 0 0
4) I’m sorry I suck so much excluded 21 0 0 0 2 1 0 10 0 0 0 0 0
5) Smart, eh. I’m so proud of myself excluded 1 21 0 3 0 0 0 6 3 0 0 0 0
6) Thanks for giving me this question thank 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 5 0 24 0 1 0
7) Is that everything you have for me? excluded 0 0 13 0 0 2 0 7 1 0 11 0 0
8) Is that OK? / is this correct? ask 0 0 32 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
9) You are an amazing tutor. praise 0 0 0 32 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
10) No, this is not a good task for me contradict 7 0 0 0 18 0 1 4 2 0 2 0 0
11) Hey tutor, how are you today? chat with 0 0 2 0 0 31 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
12) I totally agree with you agree 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 0 29 0
13)That’s very surprising Excluded 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 30
client incorrect Labels
Expression Best match beseech apologize to grin at suck up to thank hassle request yell at ask disagree with criticize argue with defend
1) awwww come on that was toooo hard. Give me
something easier
beseech 12 0 2 3 0 5 7 0 2 0 2 1 0
2) bah - give me something harder excluded 4 1 4 4 0 5 5 0 6 0 3 1 1
3) Here is your answer! Excluded 1 0 7 6 0 4 0 11 3 0 0 0 1
4) I’m sorry I suck so much Excluded 0 25 1 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
5) Whatever, I’m still so proud of myself defend 0 0 4 0 2 5 0 0 0 6 0 1 16
6) Thanks for giving me another chance thank 0 0 0 4 29 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
7) not so sure, but we’ll give it a try. Excluded 2 2 7 3 2 3 2 0 4 5 0 1 2
8) Stupid computer program!! yell at 0 0 1 1 0 2 0 27 1 0 2 0 0
9) You are not an effective teaching tool! criticize 0 0 1 2 0 3 0 13 0 0 12 3 0
10) Please, can we try something a little easier? request 14 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 4 1 1 0 1
11) I don’t agree with you on that disagree with 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 1 4 3
12) But, there are more than one specific answer for
this
argue with 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 2 13 11
13) But, that has nothing to do with this topic argue with 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 5 7 12 6
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Table 10: Results of the EPA rating of Client Expressions.
client incorrect
survey results ACT database
1− 9 scale −4.3− 4.3 scale
Expression E P A E P A E P A
1) awwww come on that was toooo hard . 3.77 6.27 5.31 -1.23 1.27 0.31 -1.39 -0.8 -0.5
2) bah - give me something harder 4.58 6.69 6.35 -0.42 1.69 1.35 - - -
3) Here is your answer! 5.65 6.04 6.08 0.65 1.04 1.08 1.59 0.73 0.16
4) I’m sorry I suck so much 2.92 5.35 3.88 -2.08 0.35 -1.12
5) Smart, eh. I’m so proud of myself 5.31 6.04 5.29 0.31 1.04 0.29
6) Thanks for giving me this question 6.6 6 6.17 1.6 1 1.17 2.93 2.01 1.49
7) Is that everything you have for me? 4.71 6.21 6.04 -0.29 1.21 1.04
8) Is that OK? / is this correct? 5.44 5.56 5.48 0.44 0.56 0.48 1.16 0.74 0.41
9) You are an amazing tutor. 7.96 7.5 6.5 2.96 2.5 1.5 2.07 2.03 1.07
10) No, this is not a good task for me 3.72 5.24 4.72 -1.28 0.24 -0.28 0.39 0.54 0.85
11) Hey tutor, how are you today? 5.88 4.92 5.2 0.88 -0.08 0.2 1.9 0.82 0.71
12) I totally agree with you 6.68 6.36 5.96 1.68 1.36 0.96 1.66 1.27 0.87
13)That’s very surprising 5.56 6.24 5.72 0.56 1.24 0.72
client incorrect
survey results ACT database
1− 9 scale −4.3− 4.3 scale
Expression E P A E P A E P A
1) awwww come on that was toooo hard. Give me
something easier
3.25 5.65 5 -1.75 0.65 0 -0.61 -0.03 0.33
2) bah - give me something harder 3.46 5.91 6.09 -1.54 0.91 1.09
3) Here is your answer! 4.42 5.74 5.48 -0.58 0.74 0.48
4) I’m sorry I suck so much 2.75 5.13 3.7 -2.25 0.13 -1.3
5) Whatever, I’m still so proud of myself 3.42 5.09 5.13 -1.58 0.09 0.13 1.83 2.3 1.21
6) Thanks for giving me another chance 6.79 6.22 6 1.79 1.22 1 2.93 2.01 1.49
7) not so sure, but we’ll give it a try. 5.54 5.91 6 0.54 0.91 1
8) Stupid computer program!! 2.25 5.92 4.79 -2.75 0.92 -0.21 -1.05 0.39 1.69
9) You are not an effective teaching tool! 2.35 6.35 4.87 -2.65 1.35 -0.13 -0.84 0.54 -0.09
10) Please, can we try something a little easier? 4.71 5.67 5.63 -0.29 0.67 0.63 0.43 -0.21 0.03
11) I don’t agree with you on that 4.67 5.88 5.79 -0.33 0.88 0.79 0.06 0.75 0.63
12) But, there are more than one specific answer for
this
4.92 6.13 6.13 -0.08 1.13 1.13 -0.9 0.75 1.39
13) But, that has nothing to do with this topic 3.79 6.5 5.38 -1.21 1.5 0.38 -0.9 0.75 1.39
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E COACH system simulation results
We investigated the COACH system in simulation using an agent with an affective identity of
“assistant”, and a client with an affective identity of “elder” (EPA = [1.67, 0.01,−1.03]). The
client knows the identity of the agent, but the agent must learn the identity of the client. Agent
and client both know their own identities. We compare two types of policies: one where the
affective actions are computed with BayesAct, and the other where the affective actions are
fixed. We used a simple heuristic for the propositional actions where the client is prompted if
the agent’s belief about the client’s awareness (AW ) falls below 0.4.
Table 11 shows an example simulation between the agent and a client (PwD) who holds the
affective identity of “elder”. This identity is more powerful and more good than that of “patient”
(the default). Thus, the BayesAct agent must learn this identity (shown as fc in Table 11) during
the interaction if it wants to minimize deflection. We see in this case that the client starts with
AW=”yes” (1) and does the first two steps, but then stops and is prompted by the agent to
rinse his hands. This is the only prompt necessary, the deflection stays low, the agent gets a
reasonable estimate of the client identity (EPA = [2.8,−0.13,−1.36], a distance of 1.0). We
show example utterances in the table that are “made up” based on our extensive experience
working with PwD interacting with a handwashing assistant.
Table 12 shows the same client (“elder”) but this time the agent always uses the same affec-
tive actions: if prompting, it “commands” the user (EPA = [−0.09, 1.29, 1.59]) and when not
prompting it “minds” the user (EPA = [0.86, 0.17,−0.16]). Here we see that the agent prompts
cause significant deflection, and this causes the PwD to lose awareness (to become confused)
and not make any progress. The handwashing takes much longer, and the resulting interaction
is likely much less satisfying.
We have also run random simulations like the ones shown in Tables 11 and 12. For each set of
simulations, we select a true affective identity for the client, and we either use BayesAct to select
affective actions for the agent, or we use a fixed pair (one for the prompt, one for non-prompt
actions). We run 10 sets of 10 simulated trials, stopping in each trial after 50 iterations or
when the client finishes the task, whichever comes first. In Table 13 we show the means and the
standard error of the means (of each set of 10 simulations) of the number of interactions, and
of the last planstep reached. We can see that, for client identities of “elder” and “patient”, the
fixed policy of “confer with” (EPA = [1.87, 0.87,−0.35]) does equally well as BayesAct. The
fixed policy of “prompt” (EPA = [0.15, 0.32, 0.06]) also does equally well for “patient”, but does
more poorly (takes more iterations) for “elder”. We see the fixed policy of “command” does
badly for both, but less so for “patient” than “elder”.
We then look at more extreme identities. If the client has the identity of a “convalescent”
(EPA = [0.3, 0.09,−0.03]), then we see the same effect as with “elder”. However, if the client
has a much more powerful identity (“boss” EPA = [0.48, 2.16, 0.94], as they might believe if
they used to be such an identity), then we see that all prompting methods work more slowly
(the “boss” does not need prompting!!), and both fixed policies of “confer with” or “prompt”
works less well than BayesAct. This is an indication that a “one-size fits all” policy may not
work very well, whereas BayesAct provides a flexible and adaptive affective prompting strategy
for PwD. Our future work is to integrate this with our current prototypes, and run trials with
PwD.
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turn client state action agent expected client
aw ps prop. affect fc ps aw defl.
initial 1 0 - - [0.9,-0.69,-1.05] 0 0.72 -
client 1 0 put on soap [1.6,0.77,-1.4] [2.3,-0.77,-1.23] 0.96 0.94 0.23
“[looks at sink]”
agent 1 1 - [1.3,0.26,-0.40] [2.41,-0.81,-1.23] 1.0 ≈1.0 1.07
“[looks at client]”
client 1 1 turn on tap [2.2,0.90,-1.1] [2.7,-0.36,-1.37] 3.0 0.99 0.99
“oh yes, this is good”
agent 1 3 - [1.3,0.4,0.35] [2.7,-0.37,-1.38] 3.0 ≈1.0 1.47
“I’m here to help, Frank”
client 1 3 - [2.1,0.72,-1.4] [2.6,-0.34,-1.38] 3.0 0.01 1.14
“this is nice”
agent 0 3 rinse hands [1.5,0.67,0.06] [2.6,-0.34,-1.39] 3.0 ≈0.0 1.50
“Great job, Frank, time to rinse your hands now”
client 0 3 rinse hands [1.9,0.78,-1.4] [2.7,-0.31,-1.44] 4.0 0.99 1.11
“oh yes, this is good”
agent 1 4 - [1.6,0.47,-0.13] [2.7,-0.30,-1.4] 4.0 ≈1.0 1.61
“good job Frank”
client 1 4 turn tap off [2.0,0.94,-1.3] [2.6,-0.17,-1.24] 5.9 0.96 1.19
“[looks at tap]”
agent 1 6 - [1.5,0.56,-0.35] [2.6,-0.17,-1.2] 6.0 ≈1.0 1.56
“This is nice, Frank”
client 1 6 - [2.1,0.86,-1.42] [2.8,-0.14,-.14] 6.0 ≈0.0 1.22
“Oh yes, good good”
agent 1 6 dry hands [1.4,0.66,-0.06] [2.8,-0.13,-1.36] 6.0 ≈0.0 1.55
“[looks at]”
client 1 6 dry hands [1.94,1.1,-1.9] - - - 1.55
“all done!”
client 1 7 - - - - - -
Table 11: Example simulation between the agent and a client (PwD) who holds the affective
identity of “elder” (EPA = [1.67, 0.01,−1.03]). Affective actions chosen by BayesAct. Prompts
are delivered if Pr(AW ) falls below 0.4. Possible utterances for agent and client are shown
that may correspond to the affective signatures computed.
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turn client state action agent expected client
aw ps prop. affect fc ps aw defl.
initial 1 0 - - [0.9,-69,-1.05] 0 0.72 -
client 1 0 put on soap [1.6,0.77,-1.4] [2.3,-0.77,-1.23] 0.96 0.94 0.23
“[looks at sink]”
agent 1 1 - [0.85,0.17,-0.16] [2.41,-0.81,-1.23] 1.0 ≈1.0 1.34
“[looks at client]”
client 1 1 turn on tap [2.3,0.90,-1.19] [2.62,-0.42,-1.43] 2.98 0.99 1.21
“oh yes, this is good”
agent 1 3 - [0.85,0.17,-0.16] [2.7,-0.42,-1.5] 3.0 ≈1.0 1.86
“[looks at client]”
client 1 3 - [2.2,0.79,-1.47] [2.6,-0.30,-1.4] 3.0 ≈0.0 1.56
“oh yes, this is good”
agent 0 3 rinse hands [-0.1,1.29,1.59] [2.6,-0.30,-1.4] 3.0 ≈0.0 4.11
“Rinse your hands now!!”
client 0 3 - [1.9,1.4,-1.7] [2.5,-0.30,-1.3] 3.0 ≈0.0 2.90
“[looks at sink]”
agent 0 3 rinse hands [-0.1,1.29,1.59] [2.5,-0.29,-1.3] 3.0 ≈0.0 5.80
“Rinse your hands now!!”
client 0 3 - [1.9,0.97,-1.9] [2.4,-0.27,-1.26] 3.0 0.02 4.28
“[looks at sink]”
agent 0 3 rinse hands [-0.1,1.29,1.59] [2.4,-0.26,-1.27] 3.0 0.02 7.05
...continues for 48 more steps until client finally finishes ...
Table 12: Example simulation between the agent and a client (PwD) who holds the affective
identity of “elder” (EPA = [1.67, 0.01,−1.03]). Affective actions were fixed: if prompting, it
“commands” the user (EPA = [−0.09, 1.29, 1.59]) and when not prompting it “minds” the user
(EPA = [0.86, 0.17,−0.16]). Possible utterances for agent and client are shown that may
correspond to the affective signatures computed.
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true client agent action interactions last planstep
identity prompt non-prompt
elder BayesAct 12.8± 0.6 7.0± 0.0
prompt mind 16.9± 1.4 7.0± 0.0
confer with mind 12.6± 0.7 7.0± 0.0
command mind 41.5± 5.1 5.3± 0.7
patient BayesAct 13.0± 0.6 7.0± 0.0
prompt mind 12.9± 1.0 7.0± 0.0
confer with mind 12.6± 0.6 7.0± 0.0
command mind 30.1± 6.9 5.3± 0.7
convalescent BayesAct 13.3± 0.7 7.0± 0.0
prompt mind 19.0± 2.0 7.0± 0.0
confer with mind 13.9± 0.63 7.0± 0.0
command mind 31.6± 3.7 6.7± 0.2
boss BayesAct 25.0± 1.5 7.0± 0.0
prompt mind 50.6± 0.5 3.6± 0.30
confer with mind 32.1± 2.7 6.9± 0.14
command mind 50.6± 0.6 2.7± 0.66
Table 13: Means and the standard error of the means (of each set of 10 simulations) of the
number of interactions, and of the last planstep reached for simulations between agent and client
with the identity as shown. Agent propositional policy is the heuristic one (prompt if awareness
decreases below a threshold), and is the deflection minimizing action for BayesAct, or the fixed
actions as shown.
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